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CUSTODIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
CUSTOMER FUNDS
Jerry W. Markham*
If any one place his property with another for safe keeping, and there,
either through thieves or robbers, his property and the property of the
other man be lost, the owner of the house, through whose neglect the loss
took place, shall compensate the owner for all that was given to him in
charge. But the owner of the house shall try to follow up and recover his
property, and take it away from the thief.
Code of Hammurabi (c. 1772 B.C.E.)

INTRODUCTION
A series of bankruptcies by large financial institutions in recent years
resulted in massive shortages of customer funds. The first of those failures,
Refco, Inc. (Refco), occurred in 2005 after the exposure of a massive fraud
by its officers. 1 That debacle was followed in 2007 by the failure of
Sentinel Management Group, Inc. (Sentinel), which had used several
hundred million dollars of customer assets to leverage the firm’s trading
position. 2 The failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Lehman or
Lehman Brothers) during the Financial Crisis in 2008 was the largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history and resulted in extensive litigation over rights to
customer funds held in custody here and abroad.3 The Lehman debacle was
soon followed by the unraveling of Bernie Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme,
which led to billions of dollars of losses in customer funds. 4 Only a few
months later, U.S. authorities charged that R. Allen Stanford had been
running another giant Ponzi scheme out of Antigua that involved $7 billion
in customer funds. 5 A shortage of some $1.2 billion in customer funds was
discovered after MF Global Inc. (MF Global) declared bankruptcy in

* Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. T he author has acted as
a consultant and expert witness in several of the proceedings discussed herein.
1. See generally Refco: Rotten Yet Robust, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005, at 86, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/5064953 (describing this failure).
2. See In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing this
failure).
3. Patrick Fitzgerald, Lehman Trustee Ends Citigroup Fight, W ALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2012, at
C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424127887323852904578127202132976518.html.
4. See DIANA B. HENRIQUES, T HE W IZARD OF LIES: BERNIE MADOFF AND THE DEA TH OF
T RUST 10 (2011).
5. Clifford Krauss, Jury Convicts Stanford in $7 Billion Ponzi Fraud, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 7,
2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/busine ss/jury-convicts-stanford-in7-billion-ponzi-fraud.html.
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October 2011. 6 That highly publicized failure was followed by a massive
fraud at Peregrine Financial Group Inc. (Peregrine or PFG), where the
firm’s owner simply looted nearly $215 million in customer funds held in
custody. 7
These shortfalls have raised widespread concerns over custodial
arrangements for customer funds held at financial institutions. In Parts I–III,
this Article describes custodial requirements for customer funds under the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (the CEA),8 federal securities laws,9 and
banking regulations. 10 Part IV then addresses the gaps in those regulations
that allowed losses of customer funds to occur, and Part V recounts
regulators’ efforts to prevent future failures. In Parts VI and VII, this Article
will also recommend the creation of a universal custody arrangement that
can be more readily monitored and provide greater protection of customer
funds. This proposal would require that each customer account be treated as
a separate trust that would be ring-fenced from the losses of other
customers all the way from deposit at a broker or other intermediary to the
bank or clearinghouse where the funds are held in custody. Improper use of
customer funds by intermediaries and custodians would be addressed by
requiring a tri-party custodian arrangement, which would allow independent
reporting of funds held in custody for each customer.
I. CEA CUSTODIAL REQUIREMENTS
A. DOMES TIC FUTURES CUS TOMERS
The CEA requires futures commission merchants (FCMs) to register
with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC) and to
comply with CFTC rules governing the treatment of customer funds. 11 An
FCM is the analogue in the futures industry to broker-dealers in the
securities industry. An FCM accepts customer orders and funds for trading

6. Report of the T rustee’s Investigation and Recommendations at 95–98, In re MF Global
Inc., No. 11-2790 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012) [hereinafter T rustee’s Investigation and
Recommendations].
7. Jacob Bunge, Pe regrine Accounts to Be Transferred to Vision Financial, W ALL ST. J., Oct.
8,
2012,
at
C3,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10000872396390444223104578040140301343094.html.
8. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (Commodity Exchange Act), Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49
Stat. 1491 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (2012)).
9. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54
Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21).
10. See OFFICE OF THE COMP TROLLER OF THE CURRENCY , COMP TROLLER’S HANDBOOK :
CUSTODY SER VICES (2002) [hereinafter COMP TROLLER’ S HANDBOOK ], available at
http://www.occ. gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/custodyservice.pdf
(describing those arrangements).
11. See 7 U.S.C. § 6f(a).
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in commodity futures and commodity options. 12 FCM customers often have
excess margin funds (excess funds) in their commodity futures and options
accounts that are not needed to margin their open positions. 13 Excess funds
occur for many reasons, such as the closing of an open position, which frees
up the funds that were used to margin that position. 14 A favorable gain from
variation margin can also create excess funds. 15
Section 4d(2) of the CEA requires that funds of FCM customers be
separately accounted for and be held in specially segregated accounts.16
This provision was intended to require that customer funds be held in a trust
account.17 As Senator James Murray, the Senate sponsor of the CEA, noted
in 1936, this requirement was needed because FCM customers were
“rank[ed] only as general creditors. Surely they thought their margins were
regarded as trust funds and would be handled with a reasonable degree of
integrity.” 18 This mandatory trust fund status was intended to stop the thencommon practice in the industry whereby futures “commission merchants
receiving margin monies in excess of the amount required by the exchanges
to be deposited use[d] these excess margin deposits as their own capital, for
any purpose they [chose].” 19
The CFTC has explained that the CEA requirements for handling
customer funds in the futures industry are that:
[1] customer funds must be separately accounted for by the FCM, [2] must
not be commingled with the FCM’s o wn funds, [3] must be held for the
benefit of customers, [4] must be available to the customer and the FCM
[when held by a custodian] immed iately upon demand, and [5] must be
12. For a description of these contracts and their trading and the role of FCMs, see JERRY W.
MARKHAM, T HE HISTORY OF COM MODITY FUTURES T RADING AND I TS REGULATION 204 (1986)
[hereinafter MARKHAM, COMMODITY FU TURES T RADING ]. Section 724(a) of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) also required f unds of
Cleared Swaps Customers that secure swaps to be segre gated. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 724(a), 124 Stat. 1376,
1682–84 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6d(f)).
13. MARKHAM, COMMODITY FUTURES T RADING , supra note 12, at 204–05.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2).
17. FCMs were required by this provision to “treat their customers’ money as trust funds.”
H.R. REP . NO . 73-1637, at 6 (1934).
18. 80 CONG . REC. 7858 (1936) (statement of Sen. James Murray) (stating that section 4d(2)
“ merely provides that the public’s money put up for margin shall in fact be treated as belonging to
the customer, and held in trust. Who can object to this?”).
19. Id. As the CFT C noted in Dorn v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 21,253 (Oct. 6, 1981):
The language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that Section 4d was designed
for the broad purpose of protecting customers from having their money, securities or property
appropriated by a futures commission merchant, or some other depository, without adequate
legal basis, and the more specific purpose of ensuring the integrity of the futures market by
preventing the use of customer funds to finance market transactions by a futures commission
merchant for its own account or for other customers.
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calculated so as to prevent the use of one customer’s funds to marg in or
20
secure another customer’s position.

Additionally, (6) customer funds may not be used to secure a loan of the
FCM. 21
These requirements are implemented through a series of rules
administered by the CFTC. CFTC Rule 1.20 imposes the basic requirement
that customer funds be separately accounted for and segregated.22 That rule
further requires that any bank receiving commodity customer funds must
provide a written acknowledgement that the bank was informed that “the
customer funds deposited therein are those of commodity or option
customers and are being held in accordance with the provisions of the
[CEA] and this part.” 23
The Commodity Exchange Authority, the predecessor to the CFTC,
opined after the adoption of the segregation requirement in 1936 that a
third-party depository of segregated customer funds of an FCM could have
no claim against those funds. 24 To assure this result, the Commodity
Exchange Authority required banks to acknowledge that customer assets
would in fact be segregated from the accounts of the FCM.25 Banks acting
in this depository capacity were required to waive any offset rights for
credit extensions made to the FCM or anyone else. 26 That waiver
requirement was subsequently rendered unnecessary when the CEA was
amended in 1968 to apply its segregation requirements directly to banks and
other depositories of FCM customer funds. 27
Rule 1.20 prohibits the commingling of customer funds with those of
the FCM or any other person, except that customer funds may be
commingled with those of other customers—a form of collective trust.28
However, CFTC Rule 1.23 allows FCMs to keep their own funds in
customer segregated accounts to serve as a cushion in the event of an
unexpected shortfall. 29 The FCM may also invest the customer funds held
in segregation in securities specified in CFTC Rule 1.25, which includes

20. See Deposit of Customer Funds in an Offshore Depository, Interpretative Letter No. 88-14,
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,295 (Aug. 1, 1988) (describing these requirements).
21. Dorn, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,253, at *9.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a) (2013).
23. Id.
24. Commodity Exch. Auth., Administrative Determination No. 12 (Nov. 30, 1936).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 90-258, sec. 6, § 4d, 82 Stat. 26, 27–28 (1968)
(codified as amen ded at 7 U.S. C. § 6 d(b) (2012)). The 1968 amendments sought “ to prohibit
expressly customers’ funds from being used to offset liabilities of the futures commission
merchants or otherwise bein g misappropriated.” S. REP . NO . 90-947, at 7 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1673, 1679.
28. 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(a).
29. Id. § 1.23.
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obligations of the U.S. government and of the states.30 At variance with
traditional trust principles, CFTC Rule 1.29 allows FCMs to keep for
themselves the interest or other return from such investments. 31
CFTC Rule 1.32 requires that FCMs make a computation of the amount
required to be held in segregation as of the close of business each day.32
That computation must be made by noon of the following day. 33 The CFTC
requires that computation to be made by using the net liquidating value (the
NLV) of all futures and options customers trading on domestic exchanges.34
The NLV is computed by adding customer ledger balances, open trade
equity, net option value, securities, and other property (excluding letters of
credit), which is then grossed-up for any customer debit/deficit balances.35
The ledger balance is computed by subtracting debits from credits to the
account on the day of calculation. 36 CFTC Rule 1.12(h) requires the FCM
to notify the CFTC if funds and securities on deposit in segregated accounts
are less than the requirement. 37
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 38 and CFTC part 190 rules
promulgated under that statute 39 seek to give customer funds held in
segregated accounts under section 4d of the CEA priority over the claims of
creditors of the FCM. The House Report for this legislation stated that the
relationship between a commodity broker and its customers “is not unlike
the relationship between a stockbroker and his customers. Yet the current
Bankruptcy Act provides no special protection for customers of commodity
brokers as it does for stockbroker customers.” 40
30. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.25–.26 (requiring such investments to be held in segregated accounts).
31. Id. § 1.29. See, e.g., Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1998)
(FCM could retain the interest from such investments); Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,
822 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Crabtree Invs., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1466, 1473 (M.D. La. 1984), aff’d 738 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1984) (same).
However, most sophisticated customers with bargaining power will demand at least a portion of
such returns. See Craig v. Refco, Inc., 816 F.2d 347, 348 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussin g such
arrangements).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 1.32.
33. Id.
34. Interpretive Notice 9066 - NFA Financial Requirements Section 16: FCM Financial
Practices and Excess Segregate Funds/Secured/Amount/Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral
Disbursements, NAT’ L FUTURES ASS’ N , http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManua l.aspx
?RuleID=9066&Section=9 (last modified July 1, 2013) [hereinafter Interpretive Notice 9066].
35. NAT’L FU TURES AS S’N , MARGINS HANDBOOK 6 (1999), available at
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa-compliance/publication-library/margins-handbook.pdf. T he ledger
balance calculation includes checks that have not yet cleared. Open trade equity is the unrealized
gain or loss on open futures positions. See CFT C, FORM 1-FR-FCM I NS TRUC TIONS 10-2 (2010)
[hereinafter FORM 1-FR-FCM I NS TRUCTIONS], available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups
/public /@iointermediaries/documents/file/1fr-fcminstructions.pdf. Net option value is the
unrealized gain or loss on options positions. Id.
36. FORM 1-FR-FCM INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 35, at 5-1.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 1.12(h).
38. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
39. 17 C.F.R. pt. 190.
40. H.R. REP . NO . 95-595, at 269 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6227.
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As described below, customers of broker-dealers are covered by an
account insurance scheme administered by the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC) that provides up to $500,000 in insurance in
the event of a broker-dealer’s bankruptcy that results in a shortage of
customer funds.41 No such insurance is available under the CEA for FCM
customers.
The CFTC’s so-called Part 190 rules govern the treatment of customer
funds and securities when a FCM declares bankruptcy.42 In proposing the
Part 190 Rules, the CFTC stated:
The proposed regulations are intended to imp lement these customer and
market protections and in this regard to achieve several specific purposes,
including: (1) To pro mote equitable treat ment of customers; (2) to enhance
certainty as to the effects of a bankruptcy distribution; (3) to limit the
period during which the bankrupt estate is at risk fro m fluctuations in
value of the co mmodity contracts and other property contained therein; (4)
to permit certain transactions which may be effected between customers
without the intervention of the debtor to take place outside the bankrupt
estate; (5) to maximize recovery in kind; and (6) to prov ide an
understandable and workable method for operating the estate pending
43
liquidation.

An important element of those rules allows for the immediate transfer
of open customer futures and options positions to another solvent FCM.44
That ability is often critical in fast-moving markets where customers can
experience large losses if they do not have control over their accounts.45
Identifiable customer property may also be transferred.46 Customer losses
will be measured by the shortfall in the FCM’s segregated account. 47
B. CUS TOMERS TRADING ON FOREIGN COMMODITY EXCHANGES
The CFTC created a separate regime for the protection of domestic
customers trading on foreign exchanges through an FCM. This action was
taken when an extensive series of problems with such trading arose after the
creation of the CFTC.48 The CFTC initially acted by adopting an anti-fraud
41. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
42. 17 C.F.R. pt. 190.
43. Proposed Rules Implementing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,535–
36 (proposed Nov. 24, 1981) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 190) [hereinafter CFT C Proposed
Rules, Bankruptcy Reform Act].
44. See 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(e).
45. See Andrea M. Corcoran & Susan C. Ervin, Maintenance of Market Strategies in Futures
Broker Insolvencies: Futures Position Transfers from Troubled Firms, 44 WASH . & LEE L. REV.
849, 877 (1987) (describing these transfer arrangements).
46. See id. at 878.
47. Id. at 879.
48. See Foreign Options and Foreign Futures T ransactions, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,104 (proposed
Apr. 8, 1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 30).
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rule for foreign futures transactions. 49 There was concern, however, as to
whether the CFTC had authority to take such action. 50 Congress, therefore,
amended the CEA in 1982 to clarify that authority. 51 That amendment also
granted the CFTC authority broadly to regulate foreign futures trading,
including requirements for minimal financial standards, book and record
keeping requirements, and the “safeguarding of customer funds.” 52
To implement that authority, the CFTC adopted Rule 30.7, which
imposed limited custody requirements for domestic customers trading on
foreign commodity exchanges. 53 This rule required FCMs to set aside a
“Secured Amount” as protection for the funds of such customers.54 Like
those governed by section 4d of the CEA, funds of customers trading
foreign futures must be placed in a separate account identified as a secured
amount account and commingling of FCM funds is prohibited, except to the
extent the FCM places funds in the Secured Amount account to serve as a
cushion against shortfalls. 55 However, unlike section 4d, CFTC Rule 30.7
was not intended to make those accounts trust funds where all of the Rule
30.7 customers’ excess funds would be held. 56
The FCM must set aside the Secured Amount only as a form of security
or deposit, somewhat akin to a margin requirement where only a portion of
the contract price is set aside as security for performance. 57 The CFTC staff
has thus noted that the funds in a Secured Amount account are a “security
deposit only;” it “is not customer money per se as are segregated funds;” it
“is ‘security’ and not a ‘trust’ of funds explicitly denominated as belonging
to customers.”58 Moreover, until recently, the FCM could invest those funds
unconstrained by the investment restrictions for segregated funds of
domestic customers under CFTC Rule 1.25. 59
The amount required to be set aside in Secured Amount accounts could
be considerably less than that required to be segregated for customers
trading on domestic exchanges. The CFTC defined the secured amount in
49. 17 C.F.R. § 30.9.
50. See id.
51. T his background is de scribe d in Foreign Options and Foreign Futures Transactions, 51
Fed. Reg. at 12,104.
52. Futures T rading Act of 1982, Pub L. No. 97-444, sec. 204, § 4, 96 Stat. 2294, 2299
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6 (2012)) (adding a new section 4(b) to the CEA).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 30.7.
54. Id. § 30.7(a).
55. Id. § 30.7(a), (d).
56. Id.
57. See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures
Industry—History and Theory, 64 T EMP . L. REV. 59, 97 (1991) (describing the role of margin).
58. Compliance and Operational Questions and Answers Concerning the Foreign Futures and
Options Rule, Advisory Letter No. 87-4, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,975 (Nov. 24, 1987).
59. See Investment of Customer Funds an d Funds Held in an Account for Foreign Futures an d
Foreign Options T ransactions, 76 Fed. Reg. 78,776, 78,776 (Dec. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 1, 30) [hereinafter Investment of Customer Funds] (amending CFT C Rules to subject
Secured Amount accounts to CFT C Rule 1.25).
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Rule 1.3 to be money, securities, and property required by a FCM to
margin, guarantee, or secure open foreign futures contracts, plus or minus
any unrealized gain or loss on foreign futures or options contracts and
option premiums. 60 This formula in Rule 1.3 varied from the NLV’s for the
section 4d segregation computation in that customer securities or excess
funds need not be included in the calculation. 61 As a result, the Secured
Amount computed under Rule 1.3 would be less than the figure computed
by the NLV method. 62 Nevertheless, for reasons of convenience, most
FCMs used the NLV method to meet their Rule 30.7 requirements. 63 For
the most part, only the larger firms had sufficient customers to justify the
expense of a separate Rule 1.3 calculation. 64
The CFTC complicated the situation by allowing those firms making a
Rule 1.3 calculation to use the lesser of the Rule 1.3 calculation or of a
NLV calculation on an account-by-account basis.65 Further complexity was
added by another formula to be used where the Secured Amount account
included funds of foreign customers trading on foreign exchanges.66 Again,
the lesser of the Rule 1.33 calculation, NLV, or foreign person calculation
could be used on an account-by-account basis. 67 These calculations were
referred to as the “Alternative Method.” 68
II. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS
A. B ROKER-DEALER CUS TODY REQUIREMENTS
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) adopted Rule
15c3-3 to require broker-dealers to account for customer funds and
60. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(p)(1).
61. Enhancing Protections Afforded Customers and Customer Funds Held by Futures
Commission Merchants and Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 77 Fed. Re g. 67,866, 67,867
(proposed Nov. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 22, 30, 140) [hereinafter CFT C
Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections].
62. As the CFT C has noted:
[Section] 30.7 requires an FCM to maintain in separate accounts an amount of funds only
sufficient to cover the margin required on open foreign futures contracts, plus or minus any
unrealized gains or losses on such open positions, plus any funds representing premiums
payable or received on foreign options (including any additional funds necessary to secure
such options, plus or minus any unrealized gains or losses on such options) (i.e., the
“Alternative Method”). Thus, under the Part 30 Alternative Method an FCM is not required
to maintain a sufficient amount of funds in such separate accounts to pay the full account
balances of all of its foreign futures or foreign options customers at all times.
Id.

63. JOINT AUDIT COMM., FOREIGN FUTURES AND OP TIONS GUIDE 5–6 (2001), available at
http://www.wjammer.com/jac/ForeignFuturesandOptionsGuide-Dec %202001.pdf.
64. CFT C Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections, supra note 61, at 172.
65. FORM 1-FR-FCM INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 35, at 12-2.
66. Id. at 5-2.
67. Id. at 12-2.
68. JOINT AUDIT COMM., supra note 63, at 5–6.
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securities and hold them in specially designated accounts. 69 This
requirement “was designed to assure that customers’ funds (as well as
securities) held by broker-dealers are protected against broker-dealer misuse
or insolvency.” 70 SEC Rule 15c3-3 is generally referred to as the SEC’s
“Customer Protection Rule.” 71 It was adopted in the wake of the so-called
“Paper Work Crisis” that occurred at the end of the 1960s. 72
Over 100 New York Stock Exchange firms failed during that crisis as a
result of their inability to deal with increased trading volumes. 73 Many
brokerage firms lost control of their customer securities, and lost and stolen
securities were widespread problems. 74 Concern was also raised that broker
dealers were using customer free credit balances for their own purposes,
and those securities and funds were lost when their broker-dealer failed.75
Congress responded to these problems by enacting the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), which directed the SEC to adopt rules
designed to protect customer funds in the custody of registered brokerdealers. 76
SIPA also created an insurance scheme that provided account insurance
of up to $100,000 per customer (later increased to $500,000, including
$100,000 of customer cash) for losses caused by their broker-dealer’s
insolvency—it does not insure against investment losses.77 That insurance
fund is administered by SIPC, a private non-profit corporation that is
funded by assessments on broker-dealers. 78

69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2013).
70. Customer Protection Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 21,865, 1985 WL 548164 (Mar. 19,
1985) [hereinafter Customer Protection Release].
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3.
72. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES : FROM J.P.
MORGAN TO THE I NSTITU TIONAL I NVESTOR (1900–1970) 364–65 (2002) [hereinafter 2
MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY ].
73. Id. at 364.
74. See id. (describing the Paper Work Crisis).
75. See generally HURD BARUCH , W ALL STREET SECURI TY RISK (1971) (criticizing these
practices).
76. Sec urity Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). As the Supreme Court noted:
Following a period of great expansion in the 1960’s, the securities industry experienced a
business contraction that led to the failure or instability of a significant number of brokerage
firms. Customers of failed firms found their cash and securities on deposit either dissipated
or tied up in lengthy bankruptcy proceedings. In addition to its disastrous effects on customer
assets and investor confidence, this situation also threatened a “ domino effect” involving
otherwise solvent brokers that had substantial open transactions with firms that failed.
Congress enacted the SIPA to arrest this process, restore investor confidence in the capital
markets, and upgrade the financial responsibility requirements for registered brokers and
dealers.
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975).
77. 2 MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY , supra note 72, at 364–65.
78. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 261–62 (1992).
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In the event of a failure of a covered broker-dealer, SIPC is authorized
to seek its liquidation by a court-appointed trustee.79 The claims of general
creditors are subordinated to the claims of the broker-dealer’s customers.80
The trustee will return all securities held in the names of specific customers,
and it then pools remaining securities for a pro rata distribution to
customers.81 In the event of a shortfall, SIPC will cover the loss up to the
$500,000/$100,000 limits. 82
The Customer Protection Rule includes a requirement that brokerdealers maintain special accounts “in the nature of a trust fund through
which a broker-dealer must effectuate all transactions with regard to all
‘funds carried for the account of any customer.’” 83 SEC Rule 15c3-3
requires that broker-dealers maintain at a bank a “‘Special Reserve Bank
Account for the Exclusive Benefit of Customers’ (‘Reserve Bank Account’)
and deposit in this account its reserve requirement as computed in
accordance with the Formula for Determination of Reserve Requirement
For Brokers and Dealers (‘Reserve Formula’).” 84
The Reserve Formula is a complex one that totals the aggregate
customer credits and debits with the broker-dealer.85 The amount of any
excess credits must then be made to the Reserve Bank Account. 86
Generally, the Reserve Formula must be completed by Tuesday of each
week as of close of business at the end of the preceding week: usually
Friday. 87 “In addition, before making a withdrawal from the Reserve Bank
Account, a broker-dealer must make a computation which shows that after
the withdrawal there is an amount remaining in the Reserve Bank Account
at least equal to that required to be on deposit.”88 As the Eleventh Circuit
has noted:
The specifics of the Reserve Formu la are fairly arcane, but its operation is
straightforward. On a weekly basis, firms must balance customer credits
against customer debits. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e)(3). Subject to some
adjustments, the Rule requires that firms hold an amount equal to the
excess of credits over debits in the Reserve Account. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-3a. As defined by the regulations, “customer credits” captures
the amount the firm owes its customers while “customer debits” refers to
See id. at 261.
See id. at 261 n.1.
See id. at 261.
See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261–62 & n.2 (1992) (describing SIPC insurance).
Reserves and Related Measures Re specting the Financial Responsibility of Brokers and
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 9388, 1971 WL 126121, at *2 (Nov. 8, 1971); see also 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2013).
84. Customer Protection Release, supra note 70, at *2.
85. SEC v. Goble, 682 F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e)(3)).
86. Goble, 682 F.3d at 940; Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for BrokerDealers, Exchange Act Release No. 55,431, 2007 WL 737662, at *6 (Mar. 9, 2007).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e)(3).
88. Customer Protection Release, supra note 70.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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amounts the customers owe the firm. If, after the firm makes the reserve
computation, it discovers that the Reserve Account balance is higher than
the amount required by the Reserve Formu la, the firm may make a
89
withdrawal from the Reserve Account. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(g ).

On July 31, 2013, the SEC adopted rule changes that require brokerdealers having custody of customer assets to file a Compliance Report with
the SEC to verify they are properly protecting those assets and periodically
sending account statements to customers. 90 Such broker-dealers must
engage an independent public accountant to examine the broker-dealer’s
compliance report. 91 Further, broker-dealers must file a new, quarterly
Form Custody report with the SEC that describes the broker-dealers’
custodial arrangements. 92 Broker-dealers must also allow SEC staff to
examine the work papers of their accountants and to interview those
accountants. 93
B. INVES TMENT ADVIS ER CUS TODY REQUIREMENTS
The SEC has adopted custody requirements for the funds of clients of
investment advisers under the Investments Advisers Act of 1940. 94 An
investment adviser is a fiduciary to its customers.95 In order to assure that
investment advisers met their fiduciary duties, the SEC adopted a custody
requirement for client funds (the IA Custody Rule). 96 It imposes strict and
robust custody requirements for customer assets held by registered
investment advisers.
The IA Custody Rule seeks to impose protections for the custody of
investment adviser funds that are comparable to those available for other
statutory trust funds. 97 The IA Custody Rule thus seeks to “enhance the
protections afforded to advisory clients’ assets, harmonize the rule with

89. Goble, 682 F.3d at 940–41.
90. Press Release, SE C, SEC Adopts Rule s to Increase Protections for Investors with Assets

Being Held by Broker-Dealers (July 31, 2013) [hereinafter SEC Press Release], available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539740621#.Ugo6rBYqhGA.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. T he Supreme Court has interpreted the Investment Advisers Act as congressional
recognition of the fact that investment advisers are fiduciarie s for their customers. SEC v. Capital
Gains Re search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (quoting 2 LOUIS LOSS, SECUR ITIES
REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961) (“T he Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a
congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship
. . . .’”); Mones v. Mones, 169 B.R. 246, 256 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994) (“ [T ]he Investment Advisers
Act gives rise to a trust that imposes a fiduciary capacity. . . .”).
96. SEC Press Release, supra note 90; see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2013).
97. See generally U.S. GO V’T ACCOUNTABILI TY OF FICE , INVES TMENT ADVISERS :
REQUIREMENTS AND COS TS ASSOCIA TED WITH THE CUS TODY RULE (2013), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655754.pdf (describing the IA Custody Rule).
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current custodial practices, and clarify circumstances under which advisers
have custody.” 98
The IA Custody Rule was designed to require “an investment adviser
who has custody of funds or securities of any client to maintain them in
such a way that they will be insulated from and not be jeopardized by
financial reverses, including insolvency, of the investment adviser.”99 The
IA Custody Rule requires “investment advisers who have custody or
possession of funds or securities of clients to segregate the securities and to
hold them in safekeeping and to set up a separate trust account in a bank for
funds belonging to each client.” 100 Alternatively, customer funds can be
held in a collective account in the name of the investment adviser as agent
or trustee for the clients. 101 The IA Custody Rule does not permit an
investment adviser to route proprietary and customer assets through the
same clearing and custodial accounts held with a bank. 102
The IA Custody Rule requires investment advisers to maintain
customer assets with “qualified custodians,” which “include the types of
financial institutions that clients and advisers customarily turn to for
custodial services. These include banks and savings associations and
registered broker-dealers.”103 The IA Custody Rule requires the qualified
custodian to hold customer funds or securities in an account, either under
the client’s name or under the adviser’s name as agent, or as trustee for its
clients. 104
The IA Custody Rule requires that investment adviser customers be
given periodic reports by the qualified custodian of the amounts held in
segregation. 105 Alternatively, the investment adviser may make such
reports, but in such a case the accounts of the investment adviser that
contain customer funds must be verified by an independent public
accountant annually through a surprise audit. 106 A report on that
examination must be filed with the SEC. 107

98. Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2176, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,692, 56,692 (Oct. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Custody of Funds
Release].
99. Custody or Possession of Funds or Securities of Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 123, 27 Fed. Reg. 2149, 2149 (Mar. 16, 1962) [hereinafter Custody or Possession Release].
100. Custody or Possession Release, supra note 99, at 2149.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(1)(ii).
102. SE C v. Sloc um, Gor don, & Co., 334 F. Supp.2d 144, 178 (D.R.I. 2004); Custody of Funds
Release, supra note 98, at 56,693.
103. Custody of Funds Release, supra note 98, at 56,693–94 (footnotes omitted).
104. See id. at 56,692–93 (discussing this requirement).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(3).
106. Id. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(4).
107. Id.
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C. INVES TMENT COMPANY ACT CUS TODY REQUIREMENTS
The IA Custody Rule 108 exempts from its reach investment advisers to
investment companies registered with the SEC under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the IC Act).109 The IA Custody Rule is unneeded for
those exempted advisers because the SEC has adopted custodial
requirements for customer funds and securities held by mutual funds and
other registered investment companies under the IC Act. 110
For example, SEC Rule 17f-1 prohibits registered management
investment companies from placing securities or other investments in the
custody of a member of a national security exchange unless there is a
written agreement in place governing that custody. 111 That agreement must
provide that the securities held in custody must be individually identified,
marked, and segregated from the securities and investments of other
persons.112 The securities segregated under Rule 17f-1 may not be subject
to any lien or charge of any kind by the custodian. 113 The securities
investments must also be verified by actual examination periodically and
must be subject to inspection by the SEC staff. 114
SEC Rule 17f-2 imposes requirements on investment companies that
deposit securities or other assets with a bank to be held in custody. 115 The
investments deposited at such custodians must be able to be withdrawn
upon demand by the investment company. 116 Investments deposited at the
bank custodian must be kept physically separate and segregated at all times
from the assets of other persons.117 This rule also imposes restrictions on
the persons who may withdraw securities from segregation. In addition, the
existence of the securities must be verified at least three times each year
through actual examination by an independent public accountant.118 Two of
those inspection dates must be selected by the accountant. 119
SEC Rule 17f-3 prohibits free cash accounts held at a bank by the
investment company except for petty cash in an amount not to exceed
$500. 120 SEC Rule 17f-4 imposes requirements on investment companies
that deposit fund assets with a securities depository or clearing

108. Id. § 275.206(4)-2(b)(5).
109. See Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012)).
110. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17f-1 to -7.
111. Id. § 270.17f-1(a).
112. Id. § 270.17f-1(b)(1).
113. Id. § 270.17f-1(b)(3).
114. Id. § 270.17f-1(b)(4).
115. Id. § 270.17f-2.
116. Id. § 270.17f-2(a).
117. Id. § 270.17f-1(b)(1).
118. See id. § 270.17f-1(b)(4).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 270.17f-3.
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organization. 121 In order to be eligible to be a custodian, those depositories,
and any intermediate custodian, must be obligated to exercise due care in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards in maintaining the assets
held in custody. 122 SEC Rule 17f-5 imposes restrictions on the custody of
funds held outside the United States,123 and Rule 17f-7 regulates the deposit
of funds with foreign securities depositories. 124
III. BANK CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS
A. IN GENERAL
General banking practices have long required funds placed on “special
deposit” by one party for the benefit of others to be segregated and not used
for securing the debts of the depositing party. 125 “A contract for a special
deposit is not required to be in any particular form; it being a matter of
intention and understanding of the parties.”126 All that is required is notice
to the bank of the special nature of the deposits:
A bank has knowledge of a special purpose account if the depositor labels
the account in such a way that it is clear that the account is a special
account. The bank also has knowledge of a special purpose account if the
depositor and the bank have entered into an agreement giving the bank
notice of the special purpose of the account. A special purpose account
defeats a bank’s right to setoff because a third party who is not a debtor of
the bank has an interest in the account. Since a party other than the bank’s
debtor has an interest in the funds on deposit in a special account, the bank
may not exercise its right to setoff the property not belonging to the
127
debtor.

Notice of a special deposit thus has important consequences for a bank.
“It has universally been held that knowledge upon the part of a bank that
deposits made by a debtor in his own name belong to a third person

Id. § 270.17f-4.
Id.
Id. § 270.17f-5.
Id. § 270.17f-7.
5B MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 331, at 547 (2002).
Id. (citing Bryan v. Coconut Grove Bank & T rust Co., 132 So. 481 (Fla. 1931); Fogg v.
T yler, 82 A. 1008 (Me. 1912).
127. S. Perry T homas, Jr., Comment, Bank’s Right of Setoff in Virginia, 41 W ASH . & LEE L.
REV. 1603, 1619 (1984) (footnotes omitted); see also Union Stock-Yards Nat’l Bank v. Gille spie,
137 U.S. 411, 422–23 (1890) (“T he circumstances surrounding the deposits, and the relations
between the depositor and the bank, were such as to impart notice to the bank that the beneficial
ownership was o utside of the legal title. With that notice, it had no right to appropriate the
deposits to pay the obligations of the depositor to the bank . . . .”); Cent. Nat’l Bank v. Conn. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54, 63–64 (1881) (discussin g special deposits); Casse dy v. Johnstown
Bank, 286 N.Y.S. 202, 205 (App. Div. 1936).

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
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absolutely precludes the bank from applying such funds to the individual
indebtedness of the depositor to it.” 128
There is general agreement that if a person who has a claim against the
trustee in his individual capacity accepts from the debtor, in payment of
the debt, or as security therefor, property which the creditor knows or
should know is trust property, the recipient takes part in a breach of the
129
fiduciary obligation.

B. B ANKING REGULATION
Banks may act as trustees for customer assets. Those activities are
governed by state trust laws but are overseen by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (the FDIC).130 The FDIC thus requires its consent before an
insured bank may exercise trust powers; it examines bank trust activities
and may sanction banks that engage in fiduciary breaches.131 It also insures
trust accounts as bank deposits. 132
OCC Regulation 9 governs fiduciary activities of national banks. 133
Such fiduciary activities include national banks that act as trustees. 134
Regulators distinguish between banks in their role as trustees and as a
deposit institution. The relationship between the beneficiaries of a trust and
the trustee is a fiduciary relationship. 135 That is not the case for bank
depositors. 136 A bank may invest funds deposited by customers but may not
do so for trust beneficiaries, except for their benefit. 137 This means, among
other things, national banks must keep fiduciary assets separate from all
other accounts. 138 However, individual trust accounts may be held
collectively with other trust accounts. 139
Large banks provide custodial services for other institutions, which
involve the safekeeping of funds as collateral for a loan, credit exposure, or
other reasons. “Banks provide custody services to a variety of customers,
128. B. C. Ricketts, Annotation, Bank’s Right to Apply Third Person’s Funds, Deposited in
Debtor’s Name, on Debtor’s Obligation, 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 239 (1966).
129. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL ., BOGERT’S T RUSTS AND T RUSTEES § 904 (3d ed.
2007) (footnotes omitted).
130. FDIC, T RUST E XAMINATION MANUAL § 10.D.3 (2009) [hereinafter T RUST EXAMINATION
MANUAL ], available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/trustmanual/.
131. Id. § 10.B.
132. Id. § 10.A–.B.3, .G.7.
133. 12 C.F.R. pt. 9 (2013).
134. Id. § 9.2.
135. Id.
136. AM. BANKERS ASS’N , T RUST OP ERATIONS 360 (1992).
137. Id.
138. 12 C.F.R. § 9.13 (2012).
139. Id. § 9.18; see Jerry W. Markham, Mutual Fund Scandals—A Comparative Analysis of the
Role of Corporate Governance in the Regulation of Collective Investments, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
67, 121–22 (2006) [hereinafter Markham, Mutual Fund Scandals] (describing development of
bank collective trust funds).
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including mutual funds and investment managers, retirement plans, bank
fiduciary and agency accounts, bank marketable securities accounts,
insurance companies, corporations, endowments and foundations, and
private banking clients.” 140 The OCC has noted:
National banks’ custody activities developed fro m providing safekeeping
and settlement services to customers for a fee, and historically are viewed
as permissible incidental [banking] act ivities . . . and often are in
conjunction with the delivery of fiduciary services. A custody relat ionship
is a contractual arrangement, and the services performed for customers
vary. Services traditionally provided include the settlement, safekeeping,
and reporting of customers’ marketable securities and cash. A custodian
also may invest cash balances as directed, collect income, process
corporate actions, price securities positions, and provide recordkeeping
services. As custody services are contractual in nature, a bank must ensure
compliance with the provisions of all applicable agreements. The custody
industry has grown significantly in recent years, and now global
custodians control trillions of dollars in assets in offices around the
141
world.

“Services provided by a bank custodian are typically the settlement,
safekeeping, and reporting of customers’ marketable securities and cash.”142
“A custodian providing core domestic custody services typically settles
trades, invests cash balances as directed, collects income, processes
corporate actions, prices securities positions, and provides recordkeeping
and reporting services.” 143 Custodians may provide securities lending
services that allow them to earn fees from the lending of their securities.144
Custodians may also conduct daily sweeps of customer accounts and invest
excess cash. 145 Global custodians provide other services such as crossborder settlements and foreign exchange transactions. 146
The concept of safekeeping of customer funds held in segregated
accounts is well recognized by banking regulators. 147 The OCC has thus
noted that the term “segregation” has been defined as the “[o]ptional or
compulsory separation of a participant’s own securities from those held on

140. COMP TROLLER’S HANDBOOK , supra note 10, at 1.
141. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Adm’r of Nat’l Banks, Interpretive Letter No.
1078, at 3 (2007) [hereinafter Comptroller Interpretive Letter No. 1078] (citations and footnotes
omitted), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/may07/int1078
.pdf.
142. COMP TROLLER’S HANDBOOK , supra note 10, at 1.
143. Id. at 2.
144. Id.
145. MONTY P. GREGOR, T RUST OP ERATIONS 25–26 (2000).
146. See COMP TROLLER’S HANDBOOK , supra note 10, at 2 (acknowledging that global
custodians perform typical services such as settling trades and executing foreign exchange
transactions).
147. See, e.g., id. at 15.
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behalf of its customers.” 148 The OCC has opined, however, that “[a]
custodian is not a trustee, and generally is not subject to the strict fiduciary
standards that govern the relationship between a trustee and beneficiary.” 149
The OCC has stated that “a custodian may perform functions that are
fiduciary in nature,” but the OCC appears to limit such a role to those
instances where the bank is exercising discretion over the trading of an
account or providing investment advice.150 This raises an issue: is the bank
acting as a “trustee” when it holds customer assets in segregation under the
CEA or federal securities laws? In that regard, the CEA does apply directly
to custodians of excess customer funds. 151 There is no corresponding
requirement in the federal securities laws, but the SEC views such
arrangements to be trust accounts. 152
The OCC has also pointed out that “[c]ustody services are contractual
in nature, and a bank must ensure compliance with the provisions of all
applicable agreements.”153 The federal securities laws, at the least, require
the custodian bank to recognize contractually the fact that funds held under
SEC Rule 15c3-3 are to be kept in segregated accounts. 154 Further, the
custodian bank must “ensure that assets of each custody account are kept
separate from the assets of the custodian and maintained under joint
control.” 155 The recordkeeping by the custodian bank must also comply
with applicable laws. 156
The interrelated nature of bank custodian roles and SEC segregation
requirements is evidenced by the fact that banks may use SEC-regulated
broker-dealers as custodians of fiduciary assets, and those funds will be
protected by SEC Rule 15c3-3. 157 Conversely, as described above, banks
are designated as qualified custodians under CFTC and SEC segregation
requirements.
IV. CUSTODIAL FAILURES
A. REFCO ’S FAILURE
The revelation of a massive fraud at Refco in October 2005 stunned the
financial community. 158 That firm had made a successful initial public
148. Id. at 84.
149. Comptroller Interpretive Letter No. 1078, supra note 141, at 3 n.8.
150. COMP TROLLER’S HANDBOOK , supra note 10, at 11; Comptroller Interpretive Letter No.

1078, supra note 141, at 3 n.8 (citations omitted).
151. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(b) (2012).
152. See Custody or Possession Release, supra note 99.
153. COMP TROLLER’S HANDBOOK , supra note 10, at 4.
154. Id. at 2 n.2; 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(4)(i)(D)(iii) (2013).
155. COMP TROLLER’S HANDBOOK , supra note 10, at 15.
156. Id. at 21.
157. See T RUST EXAMINATION MANUAL , supra note 132, § 10.F.1.a.1.b.1.
158. See Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 680 F.3d 214, 223 (2d Cir. 2012).

2013]

Custodial Requirements for Customer Funds

109

offering of its stock only a few months before its bankruptcy. 159 Refco
failed after it announced a previously undisclosed loss from uncollectible
receivables in the amount of $430 million and advised that investors could
not rely upon its financial statements.160 The uncollectible receivables had
arisen from customer losses in the late 1990s, which eventually reached
some $1 billion. 161 Refco hid those losses on its books through an elaborate
“round robin” loan scheme that took the receivable off Refco’s book at the
end of each accounting period and restored it immediately afterwards.162
This scheme was carried out over a period of several years by two Refco
chief executive officers, both of whom were sentenced to long prison
terms. 163
Refco was the parent company of Refco, LLC, the largest independent
futures commission merchant in the United States. 164 After Refco
announced its previously undisclosed account receivable loss, customers at
Refco’s affiliates began seeking to withdraw their funds, resulting in a
“[p]roverbial ‘run on the bank’” that Refco sought to stop by declaring a
fifteen-day moratorium on withdrawals. 165 However, Refco declared
bankruptcy only a few days later.166 The customer accounts at Refco, LLC
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 223 (describing this scheme). T he Refco bankruptcy examiner described these
transactions as follows:

159.
160.
161.
162.

The Round Trip Loans were two short term loans of several weeks duration that spanned the
end of Refco’s fiscal year-end or quarterly financial reporting periods. The first loan was
made by a Refco entity to a third party at a certain interest rate for a certain period of time.
The second one was made by that same third party to RGHI for the same period of time, but
at a higher interest rate. The repayment of the loan by RGHI to the third party was
guaranteed by RGL and the third party was also indemnified by RGL against any loss or
expense for entering into the Round Trip Loan.
The funds or credit advanced for the loan to the third party were deposited into the third
party’s account with RCM. Those funds were then transferred at the third party’s request
from the third party’s account at RCM to RGHI’s account at RCM. The effect of these
transactions was to reduce RGHI’s receivable balance owed to RCM by the amount of the
Round Trip Loan, and to substitute a receivable in that amount from the third party. In most
cases, these were bookkeeping entries and no cash actually “moved.” After the end of the
applicable reporting period, the process was reversed and unwound.
Final Report of Examiner at 4, In re Refco Inc., No. 05-60006 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2007).
163. Ameet Sachdev, Refco Inc.: Former Mayer Brown Partner Joseph Collins Sentenced to 7
Years in Prison, CHI. T RIB., Jan. 15, 2010, at C23, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com
/2010-01-15/news/1001150112_1_refco-mayer-brown-sentenced.
164. Refco had previously settled a case with the CFT C over its failure to properly segregate
customer funds. T he CFT C charged in that case that Refco removed customer funds from
segre gation each day and use d those funds to pay down its bank loans. Refco deposited a check
from an affiliate to cover the amounts required to be segre gated, but the bank account of the
affiliate had insufficient funds to cover the checks. See Refco, Inc., CT FC Docket 95-2, 1994
CT FC LEXIS 348, at *5 (Dec. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Refco, Inc.].
165. Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 680 F.3d 214, 223 (2d Cir. 2012).
166. Id.
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were held in segregation under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.167
Those accounts were quickly auctioned off to Man Group for $323 million
and were transferred in bulk to a Man Group affiliate, Man Financial.168
That transfer was accomplished without significant loss to Refco, LLC
customers. 169
Customers at another Refco affiliate were not so fortunate. One of
Refco’s affiliates was Refco Capital Markets, Ltd., a Bermuda-chartered
securities and foreign exchange broker that traded over-the-counter
derivatives for clients. 170 RCM’s operations were conducted “under the
leadership of, and through a sales force of account officers and brokers
employed by, its affiliated corporation, Refco Securities, LLC, (‘RSL’), a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Refco that operated as a U.S.-based brokerdealer registered with the SEC.” 171
Customer funds were transferred to RCM from accounts at Refco, LLC,
an FCM that was segregated under the CEA.172 RCM held itself out as an
unregulated offshore broker, and “RCM Customers’ securities and other
property deposited in their accounts were not segregated but were
commingled in a fungible pool. As a result, no particular security or
securities could be identified as being held for any particular customer.” 173
It was charged in class action lawsuits that RCM had used customer
funds totaling several hundred million dollars to fund Refco’s operations
and help conceal the unreported uncollectible receivable loss. 174 Charges
were also made by hedge fund investors, including celebrity investor James
B. Rogers, that funds were improperly transferred out of Refco, LLCsegregated accounts to unsegregated accounts at RCM.175 Rogers’s funds
had some $362 million on deposit with Refco,176 but he was able to recover
all of those funds through various recovery efforts. 177
The Refco bankruptcy trustee negotiated the return to the Refco
bankruptcy estate of $263 million of the $312 million that a group of hedge
funds had withdrawn from RCM two days after Refco announced its
previously undisclosed account receivable loss.178 Those investors brought
167. Refco, Inc., supra note 164, at *5–6.
168. Alistair Barr, Man Group Wins Refco LLC Auction, W ALL ST. J. MARKETW ATCH (Nov.
10, 2005, 8:51 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/man-group-wins-refco-llc-auction-priceset-at-323m.
169. Id.
170. Bennett, 680 F.3d at 220.
171. Id. at 223.
172. Id. at 220.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 224.
175. Barr, supra note 168.
176. 4 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM ENRON ERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBP RIME CRISIS (2004–2006) 248 (2011).
177. Seip v. Rogers Raw Materials Fund, L.P., 948 N.E.2d 628, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
178. In re Refco Inc., 505 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2007).
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litigation seeking damages from Refco’s auditors, lawyers, and other
professionals, claiming they aided and abetted Refco’s fraud.179 A district
court denied a motion to dismiss by Refco’s auditors on the aiding and
abetting claims in that litigation. 180 The court also allowed claims for
secondary liability brought against Refco’s auditors, lawyers, and
underwriters to proceed181 but narrowed the duties claimed to be owed by
those professionals. 182
Various class actions were brought to challenge those transfers, and
some of that litigation is still pending. In Capital Management Select Fund
v. Bennett,183 the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims brought
by hedge funds against Refco’s officers and auditors. 184 The court held that
the RCM customer agreement allowed customer securities to be
rehypothecated. 185 The court could find no strong inference of scienter
where the firm used customer funds and securities to fund its trading
operations. 186
The Refco failure raised few concerns with the CFTC’s segregation
requirements because they worked remarkably well in protecting customer
funds and securities. The transfer of customer positions to MF Global also
went smoothly. 187 That being said, those customers who removed their
funds from segregation at Refco, LLC to unregulated accounts at RCM did
suffer massive losses. 188 Those losses evidenced that all custody and
safekeeping arrangements do not provide the same protections as those
available under the CEA.
B. THE SENTINEL FAILURE
The failure of Sentinel in August 2007 was one of the first casualties
stemming from the Financial Crisis, which peaked a few months later.189
Sentinel was headquartered in Northbrook, Illinois, and was registered with
the CFTC as an FCM and the SEC as an investment adviser.190 Sentinel’s
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 148–50 (2d Cir. 2010).
In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig., 826 F. Supp.2d 478, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig., 859 F. Supp.2d 644, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
In re Refco Inc., 505 F.3d at 115.
Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 680 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 219.
See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 626 F.3d 673, 677–78 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of
other claims).
186. Bennett, 680 F.3d at 214.
187. CME Group Continues Transfer of MF Global Customer Accounts, CME GRP . (Nov. 4,
2011), http://investor.cmegroup.com/investor-relations/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=621115.
188. In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d 478, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
189. See James Lydon, Two Executives Accused of $500 Million Fraud, W HITE COLLAR CRIME
& I NTERNAL I NVESTIGATIONS (June 4, 2012), http://www.thewhitecollarblog.com/2012/06/04
/two-executives-accused-of-500-million-fraud/.
190. Lene Powell, District Court Reconsiders Segregated Funds Ruling, Finds Liability, DODD FRANK NEWS CENTER (Aug. 17, 2012), http://financialreform.wolterskluwerlb.com/2012/08
/district-court-reconsiders-segregated-funds-ruling-finds-liability.html.
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day-to-day operations involved the management of cash investments for
proprietary and customer funds of FCMs, hedge funds, financial
institutions, pension funds, and individuals. 191
The CEA defines an FCM to be an entity that accepts both customer
orders and funds. 192 Sentinel did not execute customer orders and registered
with the CFTC as an FCM only because this would make it a permissible
depository of customer funds segregated under the CEA.193 The CFTC gave
Sentinel special no-action relief that allowed Sentinel to operate without
meeting the CFTC’s onerous net capital requirements, 194 which were
deemed unneeded because Sentinel would have no exposure from
commodity futures or options positions. 195
Sentinel’s selling point was its claim that its investment expertise
allowed it to produce the highest available returns on customer funds held
in custody under the CEA.196 FCMs like this approach because it means that
they do not have to incur the costs of developing their own investment
expertise, while still receiving high returns from the investment of their
customer funds. 197 Other money managers also bought into Sentinel’s
claims of expertise. 198
Sentinel then divided its investment programs into three groups. Its
“SEG I” accounts were for the funds and properties of customers of other
FCMs; “SEG II” accounts were for customers of other FCMs trading on
foreign exchanges; and “SEG III” accounts were for all other clients,
including proprietary FCM funds and the funds and property of hedge
funds, trust accounts, endowments, and individuals that invested directly
with Sentinel rather than through another FCM.199 These groups were then
subdivided into various trading programs offered by Sentinel. 200
The Bank of New York Mellon (BONY) was the depository used by
Sentinel for the safekeeping of the customer funds held in the SEG I–III
accounts.201 BONY signed separate, but virtually identical, letters in which
it agreed that all of the funds and securities held in the SEG I–III accounts

191. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 398 B.R. 281, 289 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008) (citation
omitted).
192. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28) (2012).
193. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.20 (2013) (setting forth this requirement).
194. See id. § 1.12 (setting forth this requirement).
195. Letter from James L. Carley, Dir., Div. of Clearing & Intermediary Oversight, CFT C, to
Eric A. Bloom, President & CEO, Sentinel Mgmt. Grp. n.2 (Jan. 21, 2004), in Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 29,691.
196. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated by 704 F.3d
1009 (7th Cir. 2012).
197. See id. at 858–59.
198. Id. at 858.
199. Grede v. FCStone, LLC, 485 B.R. 854, 859–60 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013).
200. Id. at 860.
201. Id. at 861.
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would be segregated in accordance with the provisions of the CEA.202 This
meant that even the SEG III accounts, which were not otherwise covered by
the CEA, were required to be held in segregation in the same manner as the
SEG I accounts under the CEA. 203
Sentinel’s business model proved to be successful after its creation in
1981. 204 Sentinel took advantage of a decision by the CFTC in 2004 to
expand the permitted range of investments for customer segregated funds
that are identified in CFTC Rule 1.25. 205 The CFTC then allowed FCMs to
engage in repurchase agreements (repos) of customer-deposited
securities. 206 That expanded list of permitted investments improved returns
at Sentinel, but the company also found a way to leverage customer funds
in a way that had not been envisioned by the CFTC. 207
In its repo transactions, Sentinel typically sold a security it was
purchasing to a repo dealer with an agreement that Sentinel would buy the
security back at some specified time in the future.208 The repo dealer kept a
haircut on the value of the security as collateral to protect itself in the event
of a decline in the value of the security and a default by Sentinel. 209
Because Sentinel did not have the resources to fund this haircut, it financed
the haircut through loans from BONY. 210 For example, if Sentinel
purchased a $10 million security from Dealer A, it had to pay that amount
for the security. To acquire those funds, Sentinel did two things. It first
transferred the security under an agreement to repurchase to either Dealer A
or another dealer and received back cash in an amount less than $10 million
because of the haircut. 211
Because Sentinel could not fully fund the purchase of a security through
a repo transaction, Sentinel then used a loan facility supplied by BONY to
finance the remaining portion of the purchase price not received from the
repo counterparty. 212 Customer assets that should have been segregated
were used to collateralize these loans from BONY to Sentinel. 213 As the
bankruptcy court later found:
202. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d at 858–59.
203. Id. at 859.
204. See id. at 857–58; Complaint at ¶ 8, No. 08CV2410, CFT C v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc.,
2008 WL 2113281 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
205. 17 C.F.R. § 1.25 (2013).
206. Investment of Customer Funds, 69 Fed. Re g. 6140, 6141 (Feb. 10, 2004) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
207. CFT C v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08 C 2410, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109747, at *4–
5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2012); see also SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07 C 4684, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 57579, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012) (reviewing Sentinel’s use of levera ge through
reverse repo transactions in a manner similar to the court in CFTC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc.).
208. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d at 859.
209. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57579, at *8.
210. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d at 859.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 398 B.R. 281, 289 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
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As a FCM, and an entity managing other FCM investments, Sentinel was
required to strictly segregate the investments of its customer groups from
each other and fro m Sentinel’s own funds. In fact, however, it d id not
segregate customer funds. Rather, Sentinel comming led customer funds
with its own funds and used the customer funds as collateral for its loans
214
from [BONY].

Sentinel experienced high returns from this program but found itself in
difficulty when dealers began demanding higher haircuts on the securities
being repoed by Sentinel and in some cases refusing to deal at all in those
securities. 215 Sentinel then failed, and BONY seized the SEG I–III
securities that Sentinel had used to secure its loan with BONY. 216
Sentinel’s Liquidation Trustee sued BONY to recover the customer
property it had seized. 217 The Trustee contended that section 4d(b) of the
CEA,218 which had been added to the CEA in 1968, 219 made the segregation
provisions of the CEA directly applicable to depository banks such as
BONY.220 The trustee claimed that BONY breached its duties when it used
customer segregated securities to secure its loan to Sentinel. 221 However,
the district court refused to impose such a duty, and the Seventh Circuit
initially agreed with the district court in In re Sentinel Management Group,
Inc. 222 The Seventh Circuit held that a depository of CEA customer
segregated funds need not return funds that were taken out of customer
accounts and used to secure a loan to the FCM where it was not shown that
the bank had acted fraudulently. 223 However, the panel rendering that
decision withdrew it a few months later.224 In August 2013, the Seventh
Circuit issued a new opinion, which held that the improper transfer of
customer funds out of segregation evidenced an actual intent to hinder,
214. Id. (citation omitted).
215. “ Sentinel’s troubles began in June 2007, when a broker who held over $1 billion in
outstanding reverse repos with Sentinel began to redeem them. T he following month, another
broker with $600 million in outstanding reverse repos followed suit.” CFT C v. Sentinel Mgmt.
Grp., Inc., No. 08 C 2410, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109747, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2012).
216. Id.
217. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d at 861.
218. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(b) (2012).
219. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 90-258, sec. 6(b), § 4d, 82 Stat. 26, 27–28 (1968).
220. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d at 865. T he CFT C subsequently noted:
The language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that Section 4d was designed
for the broad purpose of protecting customers from having their money, securities or property
appropriated by a futures commission merchant, or some other depository, without adequate
legal basis, and the more specific purpose of ensuring the integrity of the futures market by
preventing the use of customer funds to finance market transactions by a futures commission
merchant for its own account or for other customers.
Dorn v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,253 (Oct. 6, 1981), at *9.
221. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d at 865.
222. Id. at 866–67.
223. Id.
224. In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 704 F.3d 1009, 1009 (7th Cir. 2012).
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delay, or defraud creditors. The case was remanded to reconsider the
liquidation trustee’s claim that the bank should be equitably subordinated to
the claims of customers. 225
Another issue raised by the Sentinel Liquidation Trustee was the
priority to be given to the remaining Sentinel assets as between SEG I and
SEG III customers—there were almost no SEG II customer funds.226 This
dispute arose after it was discovered that Sentinel had been largely taking
securities from the SEG I accounts to collateralize the BONY loan. 227
However, only a few weeks before its failure, Sentinel substituted those
securities for securities taken from the SEG III customer accounts, so that
when Sentinel failed, it was the SEG III securities that were seized by
BONY rather than the SEG I securities. 228
The Sentinel Liquidation Trustee sought to have the SEG I and SEG III
customers share losses from Sentinel on a pro rata basis. 229 The Trustee
contended that those losses should not be borne solely by the SEG III
customers merely because of Sentinel’s last-minute and arbitrary decision
to substitute the SEG III for the SEG I securities that Sentinel had
previously used to fund the BONY loan. 230 The Liquidation Trustee also
argued that equal protection was appropriate because the SEG III customer
funds were held in custody under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.231
The Trustee contended that SEC’s IA Custody Rule should be given equal
status and protection as customer funds held in segregation under the
CEA.232 This claim gave rise to a battle of the experts over whether the
segregation requirements of the CEA were more robust than those under the
IA Custody Rule. Another issue was whether the CEA created a “floating
trust” that preempted all other trusts. 233 The district court ruled that the
Sentinel customers would share pro rata in the remaining proceeds of the
estate and that the CEA segregation requirements did not trump the IA
Custody Rule or create a floating trust. 234
C. LEHMAN B ROTHERS
The failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, was the largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history and resulted in the largest liquidation of a
In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 728 F.3d 660, 672 (7th Cir. 2013).
In re Sentinel Mgmt. Group, Inc., 398 B.R. 281, 292–93 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
Id. at 289.
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 293.
Grede v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 441 B.R. 864, 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).
See id. at 886–900; Grede v. FCStone, LLC, 485 B.R. 854, 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013).
See Grede, 485 B.R. at 870; see also Grede, 441 B.R. at 886–900.
T he floating trust concept is found in the Perishable Agric ultural Commodities Act, which
creates a statutory trust model in which “ [t]rust assets are to be preserved as a nonsegregated
‘floating’ trust. Commingling of trust assets is contemplated.” 7 C.F.R. § 46.46(b) (2013).
234. See Grede, 485 B.R. at 871.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
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broker-dealer ever.235 About $92 billion in funds and securities were almost
immediately transferred out of Lehman for the benefit of customers.236
Customers were allowed to move those funds and their accounts to other
brokerage firms.237 The bulk of the remaining Lehman Brothers securities
customers and their assets (about $40 billion) were transferred to Barclays
Bank, giving rise to “‘the largest, most expedited and probably the most
dramatic asset sale that has ever occurred in bankruptcy history.’” 238
That sale worked well for most of the accounts transferred. However,
Barclays refused to take many large accounts totaling several billion
dollars; those accounts were subject to long delays in resolving their
treatment and encountered conflicting treatment under bankruptcy laws in
various countries. 239 A dispute also arose over whether the sale to Barclays
included $769 million in Lehman accounts that were segregated under SEC
Rule 15c3-3 and $507 million held at the Options Clearing Corp. as
customer margins. 240 After extended litigation, the district court held that
those assets should not have been included in the transfer of assets to
Barclays. 241
Numerous Lehman Brothers customers, including several hedge funds
and banks, were not paid their funds held at Lehman Brothers, but the
bankruptcy trustee was able to obtain settlements over the course of several
years of litigation that allowed the return of virtually all of their funds.242
For example, the trustee reached a $38 billion settlement over funds held in
London by a Lehman affiliate and a $6 billion settlement over funds held at
a Swiss affiliate. 243 The Lehman bankruptcy trustee reached a settlement
late in 2012 with Citigroup Inc., which required that bank to return $435
million of a disputed $1 billion in funds that it held in connection with the
clearing of foreign exchange trades for Lehman’s broker-dealer affiliate. 244
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMorgan) also became ensnarled in
litigation over its role as custodian of customer plans segregated under the
CEA. In In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the CFTC found by consent
that respondent had improperly delayed the return of segregated funds of
Lehman Brothers’ customers.245 The CFTC further charged that JPMorgan
235. See 5 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNI TED STATES: FROM T HE
SUBP RIME CRISI S TO THE GREAT RECESSION (2006–2009) 524–31 (2011) [hereinafter 5
MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY ].
236. See Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at C3.
237. See id.
238. See In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 478 B.R. 570, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
239. See T rustee’s Preliminary Investigation Report and Recommendations at 62, 122, In re
Lehman Bros. Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2010).
240. See In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 478 B.R. at 579–80.
241. See id. at 599.
242. See Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at C3.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,156 (Apr. 4, 2012).
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had been making improper loans to Lehman based on those segregated
funds. 246 JPMorgan thereafter entered into a settlement with Lehman’s
liquidators in which the bank agreed to pay $100 million in settlement of
claims by the estate against that bank. 247
Otherwise, customer positions and funds segregated at Lehman
Brothers under the provisions of the CEA and CFTC rules went smoothly
and were transferred out over a five-day period. 248 However, customer
segregated assets that were subject to U.K. customer rules were not able to
be transferred and remained tied up in lengthy litigation in the United
Kingdom for several years.249 The U.K. Supreme Court eventually held that
customer funds that were supposed to have been segregated under U.K.
Financial Services Authority rules would be treated as being segregated
even if the firm did not actually segregate the funds.250 A settlement was
also reached that provided for the return of all U.S. customer funds.251 The
new U.K. Financial Conduct Authority has proposed rules that will allow
the prompt return of customer funds when a financial services firm fails.252
Hopefully, this will avoid a repeat of the Lehman debacle.
D. B ERNIE M ADOFF
On December 10, 2008, the sons of Bernie Madoff reported to
authorities that their father had confessed to them that he had been running
the largest Ponzi scheme in history. 253 Madoff was a well-known figure in
the securities industry and had been innovative in introducing electronic
trading to the securities markets.254 Madoff operated a securities brokerdealer, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS).

246. See id.
247. Ben Protess, With JPMorgan Settlement, MF Global Clients Move Close r to Payout, N.Y.
T IMES DEAL BOOK (Mar. 20, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/withjpmorgan-settlement-mf-global-clients-move-closer-to-payout/.
248. See Ronald H. Filler, Consumer Protection: How U.K. Client Money Rules Differ from
U.S. Customer Segregated Rules When a Custodian Firm Fails to Treat Customer Property
Properly, 24 J. T AX’ N & REG . FIN . I NSTITUTIONS 25 (2011).
249. See id.
250. In re Lehman Bros. Int’l (Eur.) (In Admin.) & In re Insolvency Act 1986, [2012] UKSC 6
(appeal taken from Eng.), available at http://www. supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/UKSC_2010_0194
_Judgment.pdf.
251. See James W. Giddens, How to Avoid the Nex t MF Global Surprise, W ALL ST. J., July 10,
2013,
at
A11,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424127887324766604578458624010464206.html.
252. Lindsay Fortado, U.K. Seeks to Tighten Client-Money Rules Afte r Lehman, MF,
BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2013, 8:07 AM), http://www. bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-12/u-k-seeksto-tighten-client-money-rules-after-lehman-mf.html.
253. See HENRIQUES, supra note 4 (describing Madoff’s background and fraud).
254. MARKHAM, supra note 235, at 609–13.
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“Outwardly, BLMIS functioned both as an investment advisor to its
customers and a custodian of their securities.” 255
Madoff was able to attract billions of dollars in investor funds through
claims of high returns from his so-called “split-strike conversion
strategy.” 256 In reality, there was no such strategy. Madoff failed to
segregate customer funds in accordance with either the SEC Customer
Protection Rule for broker-dealer customers or the SEC IA Custody Rule
for investment adviser customers. 257 Profits were also fabricated and
redemption requests were paid out of other customers’ funds until the whole
scheme came apart during the Financial Crisis in 2008. 258 Madoff’s failure
gave rise to over 15,000 customer claims totaling over $68 billion. 259 Actual
out-of-pocket losses were eventually determined to total over $17 billion,
and as of November 15, 2013, the SIPC trustee has recovered a little over
one-half that amount through various recovery actions. 260 That amount also
included a $708 million commitment from SIPC for its insurance
coverage. 261
After Madoff’s fraud was exposed, SIPC sought the appointment of a
trustee to liquidate BLMIS.262 That touched off a lengthy fight over how
customer claims for SIPC insurance would be computed. 263 The SIPA
trustee used the “Net Investment Method,” which computed customer
account balances by crediting the amount of cash deposited by the customer
and debiting the amounts withdrawn by the customer. 264 Customers who
255. In re Bernard L. Ma doff Inv. Sec. LL C, 424 B.R. 122, 127 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d,
654 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed sub nom. Sterling Equities Assocs. v. Picard,
132 S. Ct. 2712 (2012).
256. In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 424 B.R. at 129.
257. Id. at 129 n.17.
258. T he Second Circuit has described Madoff’s scheme as follows:
When customers invested with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“ BLMIS”),
they relinquished all investment authority to Madoff. Madoff collected funds from investors,
claiming to invest those funds pursuant to what he styled as a “split-strike conversion
strategy” for producing consistently high rates of return on investments. The split-strike
conversion strategy supposedly involved buying a basket of stocks listed on the Standard &
Poor’s 100 Index and hedging through the use of options. However, Madoff never invested
those customer funds. Instead, Madoff generated fictitious paper account statements and
trading records in order to conceal the fact that he engaged in no trading activity whatsoever.
Even though a customer’s monthly account statement listed securities transactions
purportedly executed during the reporting period and purported individual holdings in
various Standard & Poor’s 100 Index stocks as of the end of the reporting period, the
statement did not reflect any actual trading or holdings of securities by Madoff on behalf of
the customer.
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d at 231–32 (citations and footnote omitted).
259. In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 424 B.R. at 124.
260. Recoveries to Date, MADOFF RECOVERY INITIA TIVE , http://www.ma dofftrustee.com
/recoveries-04.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
261. Id.
262. In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d at 231.
263. Id. at 233.
264. Id.
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withdrew more than they deposited would have no claim for SIPC
insurance. 265 The issue of whether funds could be clawed back from
investors who were paid out more than they invested in their accounts at
BLMIS was also the subject of litigation. 266
E. SIR R. ALLEN STANFORD AND OTHER PONZI SCHEMES
Another shoe dropped on February 17, 2009, when the SEC charged
that Sir R. Allen Stanford had been running a giant $7 billion Ponzi scheme
out of the Caribbean island of Antigua, where he had been knighted. 267
Stanford was charged with and convicted of a criminal fraud involving
approximately 30,000 investors in 113 countries through fraudulent highreturn certificates of deposit (CDs) issued by the Stanford International
Bank of Antigua. 268 This fraud was the second largest in history, trailing
only Bernie Madoff in size. 269
The SEC and SIPC found themselves embroiled in a fight over whether
SIPC was required to insure customers suffering losses from those CDs.270
A federal district court judge rejected the SEC’s effort to force SIPC to
commence proceedings to liquidate the Stanford operations and provide
insurance coverage to victims. 271 Stanford owned a Houston-based brokerdealer that was registered with the SEC, but the Antigua bank, which issued
the CDs, was not so registered.272 The district court held that the victims of
Stanford’s fraud were not customers of a broker-dealer, even though the
CDs were sold through Stanford’s registered broker-dealer in Houston,
which was a member of SIPC.273 The Court held that the broker-dealer was
not performing a custodial function in selling the CDs. Rather, customers
made checks directly payable to the Stanford bank and their CDs were not
held at the broker-dealer. 274

265. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., 424 B.R. 122, 133 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d,
654 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed sub nom. Sterling Equities Assocs. v. Picard,
132 S. Ct. 2712 (2012) (stating that a customer who “ withdrew funds from BLMIS in an amount
that exceeds their initial investments and subsequent deposits” has no net equity claims).
266. See Jessica D. Ga bel, Midnight in the Garden of Good Faith: Using Clawback Actions to
Harvest the Equitable Roots of Bankrupt Ponzi Schemes, 62 CASE W. RES. L. RE V. 19, 61 (2011)
(citing In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 424 B.R. at 125) (stating that Madoff trustee
wanted the “‘net equity’ method and demanded that the ‘net winners’ return their ‘profits’” to
ensure a more equitable distribution of funds).
267. Krauss, supra note 5, at B1; see also ROBER T HOFF MAN , SIR ALLEN & ME : AN INSIDER’S
LOOK AT R. ALLEN STANFORD AND THE I SLAND OF ANTIGUA (2009) (describin g Stanford’s
background and operations).
268. Krauss, supra note 5, at B3.
269. Id.
270. SEC v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 872 F. Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2012).
271. Id. at 12.
272. Id. at 7.
273. Id. at 8.
274. Id. at 7–8.
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The Madoff and Stanford fraud schemes were preceded and succeeded
by a number of Ponzi schemes in which customer funds were
misappropriated. To name just a few, Kenneth Kasarjian raised over $800
million in a Ponzi scheme; J.T. Wallenbrock & Associates raised over $230
million in a Ponzi scheme; the Reed Slatkin Investment Club Ponzi scheme
took in over $600 million; and Kevin Leigh Lawrence raised $90 million in
his Ponzi scheme.275 The Manhattan Investment Fund in Florida defrauded
investors of $350 million; the Maricopa Index Hedge Fund raised $120
million through a Ponzi scheme; and the KL Group turned out to be a $200
million Ponzi scheme. 276 In 2005, the Bayou Hedge Fund Group was
unmasked as a classic Ponzi scheme that cost investors some $200
million. 277 Danny Pang’s Ponzi scheme involved some $700 million in
investor funds. 278 The CFTC has also brought numerous cases in recent
years against commodity pool operators who were engaged in Ponzi
schemes. 279
F. MF GLOBAL’S FAILURE
MF Global and its fifty affiliated entities failed on October 31, 2011.280
That firm was headed by Jon S. Corzine, the former governor and U.S.
Senator from New Jersey and a former leader of Goldman Sachs.281 Corzine
had tried to shore up MF Global’s declining profits by investing in
European government debt in Greece and other faltering euro zone
countries on the theory that the European Union would bail them out at 100
cents on the dollar. 282 MF Global’s $6 billion plus bet on that debt resulted
in large losses and a ratings downgrade that caused a decrease in the firm’s
liquidity. 283 A takeover of MF Global by Interactive Brokers Group Inc. fell
through after a massive amount of customer funds could not be located. 284
MF Global’s failure was the eighth-largest bankruptcy in the United
States and the largest failure of a financial services firm since Lehman

5 MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY , supra note 235, at 487–89.
Markham, Mutual Fund Scandals, supra note 139, at 120.
United States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310, 311 (2d Cir. 2011).
See 5 MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY , supra note 235, at 631 (describing that scheme).
13 JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION : FRAUD , MANIP ULATION & OTHER
CLAIMS § 27:20 (2012) (describing those cases).
280. STAFF OF H.R. SUBCOM M. ON OVERSIGH T & INVES TIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON FIN .
SER VS., 112 TH CONG ., STAFF REP ORT P REP ARED FOR REP . RANDY NEUGEBAUER, CHAIRMAN 96
(2012) [hereinafter STAFF REP ORT], available at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/files/2012/11
/MFGreport.pdf.
281. Id. at 20.
282. Id. at 31–32, 35.
283. See id. at 36–42, 47 (describin g the timeline of MF Global’s expansion of its European
sovereign debt portfolio and the subsequent losses therein).
284. Id. passim. (describing MF Global’s failure).
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Brothers.285 There was also a massive shortfall in customer funds totaling
some $1.6 billion. 286 This included about $900 million of customer
segregated funds in commodity and securities accounts and $700 million in
funds that were subject to CFTC Rule 30.7, i.e., customers of MF Global’s
CFTC-regulated futures commission merchant who were trading on foreign
exchanges.287 As described above, under Rule 30.7, only a limited amount
of their funds were required to be held in a Secured Amount account and
were not required as excess margin funds for trading on regulated U.S.
commodity option and futures exchanges. 288
An SIPC trustee was appointed for MF Global, Inc. (MFGI), a dually
registered broker-dealer and futures commission merchant. 289 Other MF
Global units were subject to liquidation by other trustees, and their claims
over remaining customer funds were conflicting and led to disputes in the
United States and in London. 290 MFGI asserted customer claims of some
$910 million against MF Global UK.291 Customer funds that were held in
MF Global UK were claimed by the London trustee to be unprotected
funds, which meant they would be treated as general creditors only. 292
However, the U.S. trustee was able to reach an agreement that allowed the
return of roughly $500 million at issue in the London proceeding for the
benefit of the Rule 30.7 customers. 293 Before that settlement, the SIPC
trustee had returned eighty percent of customer funds that were segregated
under section 4d of the CEA, but only five percent of Rule 30.7 funds had
been returned.294 Nevertheless, the MF Global bankruptcy trustee predicted
that these customers would eventually be made whole. 295 The SIPC trustee

285. See Mike Spector et al., MF Global Collapses as Books Questioned, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1,
2011),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052970204528204577009473406903312.html.
286. STAFF REP ORT, supra note 280, at 1.
287. See T rustee’s Investigation and Recommendations, supra note 6, at 2.
288. Id. at 10.
289. Id. at 1.
290. Id. at 21–22, 47, 48, 111, 161, 169.
291. Id. at 157.
292. Id. at 158.
293. Michael J. de la Merced, MF Global Officials Reach Accord over Claims, N.Y. T IMES,
Dec. 23, 2012 at A24, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/22/mf-global-overseersreach-accord-over-claims/.
294. Motion of James W. Gidden s, SIPA T rustee for The Liquidation of MF Global Inc., to
Approve Further Distributions to Former Commodity Futures Customers of MF Global Inc. at 4,
In re MF Global Inc., No. 11-2790 (MG) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012).
295. Devlin Barrett & Aaron Lucchetti, Hope for MF Global Clients — Bankruptcy Trustee
Tells Congress U.S. Customers ‘Eventually Will Be Made Whole,’ W ALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2012, at
A1,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10000872396390444405804577561531001893726.html; see also Aaron Lucchetti, MF
Clients to Get Bigger Payments, W ALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2013, at B2, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235521252782806.html.
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also predicted that the customers covered by SIPC insurance could be made
whole. 296
The CFTC filed a civil injunctive action against Jon Corzine and a
former Assistant Treasurer of MF Global. 297 Corzine was charged with a
failure to supervise and with controlling person liability. 298 MF Global was
also sued and agreed to settle the CFTC’s charges, including 100%
restitution of all remaining commodity customer claims, assuming there
were any assets available for return.299 “The proposed order also include[d]
the imposition of a $100 million penalty, which [could] be paid to the
extent MF Global ha[d] not fully exhausted all available funds and assets
paying customers and then other creditors entitled to priority under
bankruptcy law.” 300
G. PEREGRINE FINANCIAL GROUP AND OTHER SEGREGATION
FAILURES
Another large shortfall in customer funds occurred in the failure of
Peregrine, an Iowa firm that declared bankruptcy on July 10, 2012. 301 It was
discovered that over $200 million in customer funds that were supposed to
be segregated under the CEA had been misappropriated by the owner of
that firm: Russell Wasendorf, Sr.302 That conversion occurred over a period
of some twenty years. 303 There were over 17,000 customer accounts
affected by this fraud. 304
Purportedly, Wasendorf had submitted false bank statements to
regulators showing that the customer funds were properly segregated.305 A
CFTC complaint charged that “in July 2012 during an NFA examination
PFG falsely represented that it held in excess of $220 million of customer
296. Associated Press, MF Global Trustee: Some Customers Could Be Made Whole After
Losing to Collapsed Brokerage, W ASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.rohrintl.com/pdf/T WPartlMFGclientsMOREmoney-121231.pdf.
297. Complaint at 1, CFT C v. MF Global Inc., No. 13-cv-04463 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 27, 2013),
2013 WL 3231494 [hereinafter MF Global Complaint].
298. Press Release, CFT C, CFT C Charge s MF Global Inc. (June 27, 2013) [hereinafter CFT C
Press Release], available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6626-13; see MF
Global Complaint, supra note 297, at 43.
299. CFT C Press Release, supra note 298.
300. Id.
301. Ann Saphir, Peregrine Trustee Plans Return of $123 Million Client Funds, REUTERS,
(Sept. 6, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.re uters.com/article/2012/09/06/us-peregrine-bankruptcydistribution-idUSBRE88512D20120906.
302. Jacob Bunge, Peregrine Founder Hit with 50 Years, W ALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2013, at C1,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB10001424127887324610504578276021147076476?mg=reno64-wsj.
303. Saphir, supra note 301.
304. Id.
305. Michael Rothfeld et al., Red Flags at Failed Broker—Firm Was Subject of Multiple
Actions; Investigators Study ‘Incredible Forgeries,’ W ALL ST. J., July 13, 2012, at C1, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303644004577523283640238486.html.
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funds when in fact it held approximately $5.1 million.” 306 Wasendorf, age
64, pleaded guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to fifty years in
prison. 307
The CFTC filed a civil injunctive action against U.S. Bank, N.A., the
depository of Peregrine’s segregated funds.308 The CFTC charged that the
bank had used customer segregated funds as collateral for personal loans to
Wasendorf and his wife. 309 The CFTC further charged that the bank
allowed Peregrine to treat its customer segregated funds as being held in a
commercial bank account that was used to pay for Wasendorf’s personal
expenses, including an airplane, a restaurant, and a divorce settlement.310
Customer funds were also used to fund construction of Peregrine’s
offices. 311
In a separate matter, Farr Financial Inc., the CFTC found by consent
that the respondent had invested customer funds in securities not authorized
by CFTC Rule 1.25. 312 These investments included a money market mutual
fund from which funds could not be withdrawn by the next business day;
five savings or money market deposit accounts that were not permitted
investments; and a certificate of deposit whose issuer did not meet the thenexisting credit rating requirement of Rule 1.25. 313 In another case, Cantor
Fitzgerald & Co.,314 the CFTC found by consent that the respondent had
failed to maintain adequate funds in segregation when it inadvertently
transferred $3 million from customer-segregated funds to a house
account. 315 This under-segregation was only belatedly reported, and a
failure to supervise was found.316 In ABN AMRO Clearing Chicago LLC,
the CFTC found by consent that the respondent failed to segregate or secure
customer funds, meet net capital and bookkeeping requirements, and
supervise its employees. 317 In CFTC v. MBF Clearing Corp., a district
court by consent found that the defendant had placed customer funds that
were not properly segregated in an account at an institution. 318

306. CFT C Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections, supra note 61, at 67,869 (citation and
footnote omitted).
307. Bunge, supra note 302, at C1.
308. Complaint, CFT C v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 13-Civ-2041-EJM (N.D. Iowa filed June 5,
2013), 2013 WL 2421015.
309. Id. paras. 51–60, at 13–14.
310. Id. paras. 70–79, at 16–17.
311. Id. para. 51, at 13.
312. Farr Fin. Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,319 (Oct. 9, 2012).
313. Id.
314. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,444 (Nov. 21, 2012).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. ABN AMRO Clearing Chi. LLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,651 (June 18, 2013).
318. CFT C v. MBF Clearing Corp., No. 12-cv-1830 (SAS), 2012 WL 6929415 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
28, 2012).
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V. REGULATORS ACT TO IMPROVE SEGREGATION
Following the Sentinel and other failures, the CFTC and the industry
began working on proposals to prevent such events in the future. In
December 2011, the CFTC amended Rule 1.25 to remove from the list of
permitted investments for customer segregated funds corporate debt
obligations not guaranteed by the United States; foreign sovereign debt; and
in-house and affiliate transactions.319 The CFTC also changed its rules to
require that FCMs collect margins on a “gross” basis. 320 This means that
FCMs cannot merely transmit the “net” amount of customer margins owed
to a clearinghouse after offsetting short and long positions of clearing firm
customers. That requirement had been considered by the National Futures
Association (the NFA) in 1986 after a series of failures at FCMs raised
concerns over losses of customer funds.321 As that study found, however,
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the CME) and some of the other
exchanges had already imposed such a requirement. 322 Presently, the CME
is dominating futures trading in the United States. 323
The CFTC still allows swap customer funds to be commingled, but
those funds must now be treated as individual accounts and protected
individually “all the way to the clearinghouse.”324 This is a change from the
preexisting regime for customer funds segregated for trading commodity
futures. “Under the traditional futures margining model, [derivatives
clearing organizations] hold an FCM’s customer funds on a collective basis
and are permitted to use the collective margin funds held for the FCM’s
customers to satisfy a margin deficiency caused by a single customer.”325
This change underscored a flaw that has troubled the industry in the past,
i.e., the failure of a customer to meet a margin call will result in a loss to
other customer funds held collectively in segregation if the FCM does not
have the assets to cover the loss. 326
Another reform the CFTC imposed was heightened risk management
and other responsibilities on SROs, including a requirement that they
increase their access to FCM segregation records.327 The National Futures
Association (the NFA) had already acted to require that FCMs no longer
319. Investment of Customer Funds, supra note 59, at 78,778.
320. 17 C.F.R. § 39.13(g)(8)(i)(A) (2013); Derivatives Clearing Organization General
Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,374 (Oct. 1, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, 140).
321. NAT’L FUTURES AS S’N , CUS TOMER ACCOUNT P ROTEC TION STUDY 70–78 (1986),
available at http://www.pfgbest.com/common/docs/NFACustomerProtectionStudy1986.pdf.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. CFT C Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections, supra note 61, at 67,869.
325. Id.
326. See, e.g., CFT C v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85-cv-2213, 1985 WL 1106284 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 21, 1985); Incomco, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,071 (May 12, 1986).
327. Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 Fed. Re g.
36,612, 36,648 (June 19, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16, 38).
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use the alternative method in computing the Secured Amount under Rule
30.7. 328 Instead, they were required to use the Net Liquidating Equity
Method that is required for domestic futures accounts.329 The CFTC also
proposed such a requirement. 330 It would also eliminate the alternative
method for computation of the Secured Amount under Rule 30.7. 331
The NFA now requires FCMs to create a targeted amount of excess
funds held by the FCM as a cushion to assure that segregation is not
breached by a customer default. 332 This was already a common practice by
many FCMs. Restrictions were also placed on withdrawals by the FCM
from segregated accounts that are not for the benefit of customers and are in
excess of twenty-five percent of the FCM’s excess funds held in
segregation. 333
The NFA further required FCMs to provide their Designated SelfRegulatory Organization with view-only access through the Internet to
account information for each of the FCM’s customer segregated funds and
Secured Amount accounts held at a bank or trust company depository.334
The NFA planned to use such reports to conduct a daily comparison of what
the FCM was reporting as being required to be segregated and the amount
actually segregated. 335 The NFA and Chicago Mercantile Group, the
industry’s other principal SRO, were working to develop a computerized
system for monitoring segregation compliance. 336
The CFTC has further proposed revisions to its FCM reporting
requirements for net capital and segregation compliance.337 It also proposed
to add to its own rules a requirement like that of the NFA, which mandates
that FCMs set a targeted amount of FCM excess funds to serve as a cushion
for customer defaults or withdrawals. 338 The CFTC further proposed a
requirement that FCMs establish a risk management program to manage its
risks and that a risk management unit independent of the business unit be
established to monitor the program. 339
The CFTC proposed other restrictions, including a mandate of
“moment-to-moment” segregation, which means that FCMs could not use
customer segregated funds in their operations or to cover a margin call of a
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

17 C.F.R. § 30.7.
Interpretive Notice 9066, supra note 34.
CFT C Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections, supra note 61, at 67,896.
Id.
Id.
CFT C Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections, supra note 61, at 67,896.
Id. at 67,915.
Id. at 67,870–71.
T om Steinert-T rhelkeld, System for Tracking Customer Funds in Development, SEC. T ECH.
MONITOR (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.sec uritiestechnologymonitor.com/news/system-fortracking-customer-funds-in-development-31443-1.html.
337. See CFT C Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections, supra note 61, at 67,899 n.95.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 67,874.
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customer between daily segregation calculations. 340 Rather, the FCM would
have to post its own funds to cover margin deficiencies until the customer
meets a margin call. 341 The head of the CME, however, has complained that
FCMs do not have the appropriate systems to make moment-to-moment
calculations. 342 Rather, margin calls are usually issued and collected
overnight. 343 Further, most FCMs do not have the capital to cover every
momentary deficit in customer accounts, and they do not wish to incur the
expense. 344
The CFTC proposals would prohibit the FCM from withdrawing its
excess funds held in segregation until a calculation of its segregation
requirement is made. 345 The proposals would also adopt the NFA
requirement restricting withdrawals for the FCM’s own purposes of more
than twenty-five percent of the FCM’s excess funds held in segregation.346
The CFTC proposals would confirm that FCMs were liable for any losses
on investments of customer segregated funds that are made under CFTC
Rule 1.25. 347
VI. INSURANCE AND OTHER PROPOSALS FOR COMMODITY
ACCOUNT CUSTODIANS
Segregation requirements under the CEA are critical to customer
protection in the commodity futures industry because there is no insurance,
such as that available for securities customers under SIPC.348 There is thus a
disparity of treatment between commodity traders and securities customers,
who enjoy the protection of the SEC Customer Protection Rule and are also
protected by SIPC insurance. 349 There is some history behind that disparity.

340. Id. at 67,886.
341. Id.
342. Matthew Leising, CME’ s Duffy Wa rns Senate That Proposed CFTC Rule to Hu rt Brokers,
BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://www. bloomberg.com/ne ws/2013-07-17/cme-sduffy-warns-senate-that-proposed-cftc-rule-to-hurt-brokers.html.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. CFT C Proposed Rules, Enhancing Protections, supra note 61, at 67,887.
346. Id. at 67,870.
347. Id. at 67,888. T he CFT C adopted some of these proposals just before publication of this
Article. Among other things, FCMs will be require d to maintain residual interest equal to its
customers’ aggregate under-margine d amounts for the prior trade date. T his was a shift from the
moment-to-moment proposal, but it raises concerns that FCMs would require pre-funding of
margin, a requirement that could increase the cost of hedging by farmers and others. T his
requirement will be phased in over a period of five years. See Enhancing Protections Afforded
Customers and Customer Funds Held by Futures Commission Merchants and Derivatives Clearing
Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,501, (Nov. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 22, 30,
140).
348. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 261–62 & n.2 (1992) (describin g
SIPC insurance).
349. Id. at 261–62; see also Customer Protection Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2013).
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Included in the legislation that created the CFTC in 1975 was a
provision that required the CFTC to determine whether account insurance
was needed for commodity futures customers, such as that provided to
securities customers under SIPA.350 The CFTC conducted a study on this
issue and issued a report in 1976, which examined the failures of FCMs
between 1938 and 1974. 351 The CFTC report compared losses to customers
in government-sponsored insurance programs with loss ratios for
commodity futures accounts. 352 The CFTC found that loss ratios in
uninsured commodity futures accounts were substantially lower than those
in insured accounts. 353 The CFTC also concluded that the loss rate for
customers of FCMs was so low that government account insurance would
not be cost-effective. 354
As described above, the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1978 to
provide customers more protection in the event of their FCM’s failure.355
That legislation was followed by the failure of some FCMs, which raised
concerns over the efficacy of the CFTC’s segregation requirements. Those
failures included Incomco, Inc.; Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers
Inc.; and Volume Investors, Inc. 356 Those failures again raised concerns as
to whether account insurance was needed for commodity futures customers
and resulted in a recommendation by the CFTC staff that further study be
given to whether account insurance was needed for commodity futures
accounts. 357
In 1985, the CFTC staff found that failures by FCMs had increased
since the CFTC’s prior report on account insurance.358 Twenty-four FCMs
failed during that period with losses averaging $2 million annually. 359
Nevertheless, the estimated losses from FCM bankruptcies between 1938
and 1985 amounted to less than $10 million, and no action was taken by the
CFTC to seek additional legislation for account insurance. 360

350. Commodity Futures T rading Commission Act of 1974, Pub L. No. 93-463, § 417, 88 Stat.
1389, 1415 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 4(a) (2012)).
351. Report to Congress Concerning Commodity Futures Account Insurance, Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,235 (Nov. 1, 1976).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. CFT C Proposed Rules, Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 43, at 57,535–36.
356. See MARKHAM, COMMODITY FU TURES T RADING , supra note 12, at 88 (describin g those
events).
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. 23 JERRY W. MARKHAM & T HOMAS LEE HAZEN , BROKER-DEALER OP ERATIONS UNDER
SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 5.8, at 5-137 (2012).
360. OFFICE OF T ECH . ASSESSMENT, U. S. CONG ., P UB. NO . OT A CIT -469, ELECTRONIC BULLS
AND BEARS: U.S. SECURI TIES MARKETS AND I NFORMATION T ECHNOLOGY 122 n.61 (1990),
available at http://ota.fas.org/reports/9015.pdf; see also NAT’ L FUTURES AS S’ N , supra note 321,
at 16–36 (listing the abovementioned bankruptcies).
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The massive failures that occurred in this century again raised concerns
over whether account insurance was needed for commodity accounts. The
NFA and other industry groups agreed to conduct a study of the costs and
benefits of creating an insurance game for commodity futures investors
comparable to that available for securities investors. 361
The call for account insurance must necessarily clash with concerns
over the introduction of more moral hazards into the financial system. FDIC
and SIPC insurance pose the threat that customers depositing their funds at
an insured institution will no longer monitor the finances of the depository
in order to protect their assets. There is no need for such vigilance if the
customer is insured. Instead, regulators will assume the role of monitor and
adopt more costly regulations that the regulator believes will better allow it
to monitor the financial condition of insured funds—a process that, as
described above, is already underway. 362
Another cost issue is the funding of the insurance scheme. That can be
done by assessments, as is the case for FDIC and SIPC insurance, but
someone will have to bear that cost. Undoubtedly, that someone will
ultimately be the consumer. There will also be, undoubtedly, calls for
greater assessments on larger financial institutions than those for small
operations, as has been the case at the FDIC. 363
Other proposals include the creation of customer guaranty funds. This
proposal is an extension of the current guarantee funds that have been
created by clearinghouses to provide a backstop in the event a clearing firm
fails. These funds are built up over time through transaction fees, and
clearinghouses may also have the power to assess non-defaulting clearing
firms additional amounts to cover losses. The CME Group had about $3
billion in its largest guaranty fund and authority to assess an additional $8.1
billion at year-end 2011. 364 Presumably, a customer guaranty fund would
operate in much the same manner but would be in addition to the
clearinghouse funds.
What is unanswered is whether the customer guaranty fund would be
firm-specific or industry-wide. It would, in any event, probably be financed
through transaction fees paid by customers as they trade. Such fees, if paid
to a firm-specific customer guaranty fund, would drive high frequency
traders, who are now responsible for a majority of futures transactions, to
firms that do not charge such fees. That problem could be solved by
361. Ben Kesling, Futures Industry to Study Insurance Fund, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 7, 2012, 3:36
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324640104578165570825700746.html.
362. See MARKHAM, COMMODITY FUTURES T RADING , supra note 12, at 89 (stating causes of
volume investor default and the need for additional customer and market protection).
363. See 5 MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY , supra note 235, at 662 (describin g
disproportionate assessment of large banks in order to increase FDIC insurance fun d during the
Financial Crisis).
364. See CME GRP ., CME CLEARING FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS 19 (2012), available at
http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/files/financialsafeguards.pdf.
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mandating such fees and placing them in an industry-wide fund, but that
would only drive high-frequency traders offshore.
Another proposal would seek to protect customer funds through triparty custodial accounts. Section 4d of the CEA creates a bilateral custodian
arrangement between the FCM and the bank depository. 365 Presumably, a
tri-lateral arrangement would require reporting by the bank to the FCM’s
customers, telling them how much is held in custody for their account at the
bank. This would require that the bank be given access to the customer
directly, and the bank would have to be told by the FCM what amounts are
to be held in custody for each account. In years past, that would have been a
costly task, especially for large FCMs, which may carry over 100,000
accounts.366 Computerization of records now makes such a process more
doable.
Still another proposal concerns the creation of central customer fund
repositories. This would replicate in some manner the process used by the
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) for maintaining
custody of securities beneficially owned by customers of SEC-regulated
broker-dealers. That entity was created after the so-called “paperwork
crisis” that occurred at the end of the 1960s and was the result of the
requirement to exchange a paper security whenever a security was bought
and sold. 367 At that time, the brokerage community was not automated and
could not keep up with the paper flow. 368
The DTCC was created to avoid paperwork by allowing “street name”
securities, i.e., securities beneficially owned by a customer but held in the
name of the customer’s broker-dealer, to be maintained in a central
depository so that the paperwork involved in issuing a paper certificate
could be eliminated.369 Centralization also provided more security, whereas
before the creation of a central depository theft of securities was endemic to
the securities industry. 370 Clearing services, i.e., payment and delivery
functions, were also centralized through the DTCC. 371
The futures industry has long used central clearinghouses that clear and
carry all customer trades. 372 Those clearinghouses also hold in custody
customer margin funds required by the exchanges to secure customer

365. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(b) (2012).
366. See, e.g., About R.J. O’Brien, R.J.O’BRIEN , http://www.rjobrien.com/abo ut/index (last

visited Nov. 17, 2013); FXCM MENA, FXCM, http://www.fxcmmena.com/about-us/fxcm-mena/
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
367. See 2 MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY , supra note 72, at 367–68 (describin g the creation
of the DT CC).
368. See id. at 362–64 (describing that crisis).
369. Id. at 366–68.
370. See id. at 368.
371. See id. at 367–68 (describing the creation of the DT CC).
372. See id. at 367.
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trades. 373 However, the clearinghouse does not hold in custody excess
customer margin funds that are not needed at the clearinghouse level to
secure trades.374 Those excess funds are required to be segregated under the
CEA and have been the source of the losses from the FCM failures
described above. 375
Current proposals would expand the role of the clearinghouse to include
maintaining custody of excess customer funds, as well as those required for
exchange margins. 376 This proposal poses a threat to the revenues of FCMs,
which are currently allowed to keep the interest earned on permitted
investments for customer segregated funds. 377 Removing customer
segregated funds and securities from the control of the FCM to the
clearinghouses would threaten that revenue stream. To be effective such an
arrangement would also require that the clearinghouse act as a tri-party
custodian. Centralization of custody arrangements also increases the risk of
systemic failure should a clearinghouse fail. 378
One troubling problem that arose in the Lehman Brothers and MF Global
bankruptcies was the disputes between U.S. and English authorities over
customer funds held in London. 379 The Bank of England subsequently
agreed to defer to the United States and refrain from seizing London assets
when a U.S. financial institution fails. 380 The two countries were also
working on a plan to develop procedures for liquidating cross-border
financial institutions. 381 James Giddens, the MF Global and Lehman
Brothers trustee, wrote an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal advocating
that customer funds held outside of the United States be subject to the same
requirements as funds held here and that there should be greater
coordination among the international regulatory bodies.382 He also argued

373. See Proposal to Adopt Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-4 Under the Securities Exchange Act,
Sec urities Exchange Act Release No. 9388, 1971 WL 126121 (Nov. 8, 1971) [hereinafter Proposal
Release].
374. Id.
375. See 2 MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY , supra note 72, at 368.
376. See Proposal Release, supra note 373.
377. 17 C.F.R. § 1.29 (2013).
378. Commodity clearinghouses have already been de signated by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council as being systemically important. See Financial Briefing Book, WALL ST. J.,
Oct.
3,
2012,
at
C2,
available
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http://online.wsj.com/article
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379. Brooke Masters et al., UK Ready to ‘Trust’ US in Event of Failing Bank, FIN . T IMES, Dec.
11, 2012, at 13, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f3383e7e-42c3-11e2-a4e4-00144feabdc0
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380. Brooke Masters & Chris Giles, US and UK Unveil Plan to Deal with Failed Banks:
Shareholders Would Have to Take Losses, FIN . T IMES, Dec. 10, 2012, at 1, available at
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381. Id.; Masters et al., supra note 379 (describing a ssurances that shareholders and creditors
take losses rather than customers or governments).
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that company officers should face the risk of personal liability in the event
that segregation laws are broken. 383
The Ponzi scheme problem remains, but some efforts are being
undertaken to limit their operation. Many Ponzi schemes have been carried
out under the guise of hedge fund investments. 384 The SEC had tried to
regulate hedge funds by requiring them to register as investment
advisors. 385 Numerous hedge funds registered with the SEC under that rule
before it was stricken by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.386
Many of those hedge funds then deregistered.387 Ironically, however, Bernie
Madoff, who had registered under that rule, did not resign his registration
and continued to carry out his Ponzi scheme under SEC and Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) oversight until it collapsed during
the Financial Crisis. 388 This did not discourage Congress from including a
provision in Dodd-Frank that requires large hedge funds to again register
with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 389
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
issued a report in 2013 that raised concerns with custodial arrangements in
which customers knowingly or unknowingly waive a statutory trust fund
protection. 390 That was a matter at issue in litigation arising from the Refco
failure. 391 IOSCO was also concerned with instances where a broker
deposits customer funds in a foreign jurisdiction. 392 IOSCO recommended
that custodians be required to obtain explicit written consent for any waiver
or modification of a custodial arrangement. 393 It also recommended that
brokers take into account and understand the characteristics of foreign
custodial arrangements. 394
VII. UNIFYING CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURITIES
AND DERIVATIVES
The reforms presently being proposed in the wake of the MF Global,
Madoff, and other failures in this century are all piecemeal attempts to
patch a system that has outlived its usefulness. The securities, asset
Id.
Gabel, supra note 266, at 31–32.
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 877, 884.
Edward Pekarek, Comment, Pruning the Hedge: Who is a “Client” and Whom Does an
Advisor Advise?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP . & FIN . L. 913, 960 (2007).
388. 5 MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY , supra note 235, at 613.
389. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)).
390. Richard Hill, IOSCO Report P roposes Principles to Protect Client A ssets, 45 SEC. REG . &
L. REP . (BNA) 247, 247 (2013).
391. Craig v. Refco, Inc., 816 F.2d 347, 348 (7th Cir. 1987).
392. Hill, supra note 390, at 247.
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management, derivatives, and banking custody needs are inextricably
intertwined with each other and should be regulated uniformly. As it is
now, bank deposits of customers and customer securities and funds of
broker-dealers are insured but under different regulatory schemes and in
different amounts. 395 In contrast, there is no insurance for the assets of
futures and other CEA-regulated derivatives customers or for those
managed by an investment advisor. 396 Instead, those customers have only
the protection of SEC and CFTC segregation requirements.
These differing regulatory schemes for custody of customer assets may
also result in competition among customer classes where a dually regulated
entity fails, as was the case in the Sentinel bankruptcy. 397 A uniform
approach to the protection of customer custody requirements is needed. The
first step in that process is to correct the flaws in the existing systems. For
example, there should be a uniform requirement that customer funds and
assets be kept separate from those of the financial services firm. That rule
should extend across all asset classes.
The next requirement should be that customer funds be treated
individually at all levels, from FCM/broker-dealer/investment advisers to
the clearinghouse and bank depository. This would mean that, if one
customer failed to meet a margin call, other customer funds could not be
used to meet that call even at the clearinghouse level. This would require a
tri-party custody arrangement to assure its efficacy. Another needed reform
is third-party reporting to customers. This would involve independent
reports to customers of the funds or securities held in custody at either a
clearinghouse or at a bank or other custodian.
This arrangement will not assure that intra-day blowups will not occur
that will cause customer losses. Nevertheless, if such losses are caused by a
shortfall in one customer’s account, funds of other customers will not be
available to meet that shortage. Where there is a general shortfall from
fraud or other reasons, a requirement that losses be shared pro rata should
be adopted. Such pro rata sharing would also be appropriate where other
statutory trusts are affected by a shortfall, as in the Sentinel case. 398
Of course, these and other reforms will not stop future Ponzi schemes,
which flourish during boom times and are exposed on economic downturns.
There is simply no way to stop these frauds except through customer
vigilance when they are solicited by promises of large repeated gains. Bona
fide asset managers can make no such claims because they know markets
are unpredictable. Even a favorable track record over a period of years does
395. See Kesling, supra note 361.
396. See Jim Stack, How Safe Is Your Brokerage Account?, FORBES, (Aug. 21, 2008, 4:00 PM)
http://www.forbe s.com/2008/08/21/bearstearns-lehman-compliance-pf-ii-in_js_0821soapbox
_inl.html.
397. See In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 689 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2012).
398. See In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 398 B.R. 281, 292 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
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not provide assurance that gains will continue. Any asset manager
suggesting otherwise should be avoided. A good example of this reality was
Bill Miller’s stewardship of the Legg Mason Value Fund. 399 He had made
returns for that fund that topped the S&P 500 Index’s growth for fifteen
years in a row.400 However, that streak ended in 2006, and in 2008 investors
lost fifty-eight percent of their investment. 401 The loss in 2008 wiped out all
past gains and turned Miller’s fund into the worst performing mutual fund
over the prior ten years. 402
Regulated firms that run off-book operations, like Madoff, that are not
reported to their regulators can also evade this net by falsifying documents
sent to customers and regulators. There is little that can be done here except
to use surprise inspections as a possible deterrent and to look for customer
complaints that might reveal the off-the-books arrangements. 403
CONCLUSION
The debacles in recent years that resulted in the tying up and loss of
customer funds evidence a need for reform. In this era of computers, there
is no reason why customer funds cannot be tracked on a per-account basis
at depositories, as well as at the FCM. This would better assure customer
protection.

5 MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY , supra note 235, at 501.
Id.
Id.
Id. In 2011, Miller and a co-manager lost more than thirty percent of the investor funds
they had under management. Nevertheless, good fortune returned in 2012, with Miller’s comanaged fund ga ining over forty percent in value. See Suzanne McGee, Investing in Funds &
ETFs: A Quarterly Analysis — Big Names Bounce Back — Miller and Berkowitz A re Tops in Our
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